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Abstract
The paper studies the theoretical and practical application of public relations to the 
geopolitical nature of international energy projects in order to expand our understanding 
of the energy sector’s domination of the current political and social environments. More 
specifically, the paper analyses how energy companies that exhibit close links to the 
state are able to create and cultivate beliefs in the legitimacy of their exploitation of 
society’s resources in pursuit of their country’s national political interests. The focus of 
the paper is a critical discourse analysis (CDA) of the competition for legitimacy 
between Nabucco Gas Pipeline International GmbH and Gazprom’s South Stream 
Pipeline. The paper analyzes the discursive competition between the two pipelines over 
existence in, and legitimate domination of, the European discursive space. It then 
compares constructed narratives to quantitative factors that shape the European energy 
market and technical and financial specifications of each pipeline on the basis of its 
ability to adequately meet European energy demands and enhance European energy 
security. The purpose of the paper is to demonstrate how Nabucco and South Stream 
have been able to overcome discursively their technical and financial shortcomings to 
become perceived as geopolitical tools in a zero-sum game competition and how only 
this meaning enables the projects to exist.
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Introduction
6
Gazprom Neft, the oil producing arm of Russian energy giant Gazprom, has brought in 
City shop Hudson Sandler as part of plans to step up its international communications 
efforts. 
- PRWeek, 2 June 2010 
Grayling has been selected to handle a six-figure PR and public affairs brief for a 
planned gas pipeline [Nabucco] aimed at breaking Russia’s grip on Europe’s gas 
supply. 
- PR Week, 18 June 2010
In the summer of 2010, when Gazprom and Nabucco contracted different private 
London PR firms, it became clear: the geopolitical competition for supplying Europe 
with gas has entered the discursive realm of public relations. With the Russia-EU gas 
relationship already masked by a heavy layer of vested political interest, media 
dramatization and politicised analysis, it was just a matter of time that professional PR 
practitioners were brought in to direct public opinion and construct public approval. 
This discursive competition – that parallels the more complex technological competition 
on the ground – allows us for the first time to study how energy companies that exhibit 
close links to the state are able to create and cultivate beliefs in the legitimate 
exploitation of society’s resources in pursuit of the state’s political interests. 
Energy’s critical importance to every aspect of modern life and its increasing 
scarceness makes this commodity one of the most sought after on the global arena. 
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States and private energy firms have been known to use all available means – including 
military capacity – to secure their access to natural energy resources. But even the most 
coordinated technological approach or the most forceful military offensive may prove 
short-lived when faced with today’s growing influence of targeted civil activism and 
political importance of public opinion. For example, when Gazprom’s subsidiary, 
Gazprom Marketing & Trading, established itself in London, it found that pesky Brits 
were cautious in trusting a company that they deemed to be an extension of the Russian 
state. Suspicion and intrigue surrounded the company and worked against its bid for 
British Gas, which it has been rumoured to have been considering. The case clearly 
demonstrates how negative perception of an energy company among the general public 
can adversely affect its merger and acquisition activities, expansion of client base and 
hinder general business operations. 
Yet, while there is a strong consensus and abundance of literature outlining 
energy’s role as one of the most politicised topics of our time, there is no systematic 
inquiry into how complex energy projects – initially reserved for specialists in geology 
and engineering - have been able to enter the everyday discourse of the general public. 
Although the concept of pipelines being effectively utilized as leverages for various 
external geo-political and economic purposes is widely researched, it is important to 
remember that pipelines per se – initially merely physical products of engineering 
projects, signifying no more than a conduit of pipe used for conveyance of water, gas or 
petroleum products – cannot be considered as ‘actors’ in the advancement of national 
and business interests on the international arena. However, scholarly work 
systematically treats pipelines as ‘actors’ and never addresses the question of how these 
inanimate pipelines acquire the meaning and assume the power to be able to serve as 
powerful tools for the advancement of national and corporate agendas.
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 This paper intends to address and fill this conceptual gap, by analysing how oil 
and gas corporations exhibiting close links to states discursively legitimize their 
business operations and construct meaning around pipelines to achieve political 
interests. This research will provide insight into how pipelines become “powerful” in 
the geo-political context and how this constructed meaning does not always reflect the 
objective reality underlying it. Ultimately, the paper seeks to expand our understanding 
of the energy corporations’ ability to legitimately dominate their stakeholders’ 
perceptions of reality and influence the construction of particular narratives to dominate 
public discursive spaces. It then demonstrates how these narratives – in the instance of 
Nabucco and South Stream – become more powerful than objective reality and how 
they orient policy more than rational considerations. 
The paper draws from various theories that have previously never been 
systematically incorporated and applied to practical research cases. Because energy 
studies have traditionally exhibited consistent preponderance with geopolitics, the paper 
begins with an overview of the traditional geopolitical approaches to the study and 
interpretation of energy as a source of power in International Relations. Since this 
perspective is based on the assumption that actors seek to maximize their energy 
security by adopting a zero-sum game logic, the paper then proceeds with a review of 
security theories, including their relevance to energy, in order to demonstrate the 
constructivist nature of European energy security. The works of Ole Waever and Barry 
Buzan are reviewed, as their leading position in the Copenhagen School of security 
studies forms the theoretical basis of this field. In particular, one of the main theories of 
this paper – the securitization theory – is described in greater detail, as it provides 
valuable insight into the process through which issues become perceived as threats. In 
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alignment with the securitisation theory, the paper assumes that energy and “pipeline 
politics” have been securitised and are today regarded in terms of security (Ciuta, 2010).
Because the securitisation theory stresses the process of defining and 
constructing a security threat and stresses the dependency of this process on language, it 
becomes natural to describe and expand the conceptual link between securitisation 
theory and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). CDA allows us to study and hence, to 
some degree also to predict, how reality is formed and points to methodology that can 
be employed to consistently analyze these processes. Finally, because both the 
securitization and the CDA theories imply the existence of hierarchical relations within 
a society and the ability of securitization actors to dominate and orient to some degree 
public discourses, the paper discusses Max Weber’s theories on domination and 
legitimacy, as these form the foundation of the presented research and link security 
theory to the more practical field of public relations. 
The theoretical background allows us to make and supports the fundamental 
insight of the paper, namely that public perception of security threats is constructed 
within and by a pre-existing discourse, under the pressure of securitizing actors that 
have vested interest in producing and cultivating certain beliefs and enjoy legitimate 
domination allowing them to extract voluntary compliance from the public. 
Additionally, in alignment with conclusions formulated by a number of focused studies, 
it is assumed that Nabucco and South Stream pipeline projects are involved not in a 
“straightforward economic competition for profits,” nor in a classical geopolitical 
rivalry for influence and privileged access, but rather that the involved parties have 
powerful political incentives relating to their global prestige, credibility and image 
(Baev and Overland, 2010: 4). The resulting competition between Nabucco and South 
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Stream is hence presented as a discursive battle for legitimate domination of the 
European discursive space (on energy security) for political purposes.
The paper is structured in four sections, correlated to the expanded CDA 
methodological framework. First, I analyse communication activities of Nabucco and 
South Stream to demonstrate the narratives that these projects attempt to evoke in order 
to claim legitimate domination over the European discursive space. Second, I analyse 
mainstream media reports relating to the two pipelines to demonstrate the constructed 
meaning as it exists in the European discursive space. Third, I compare constructed 
discursive space to the technical and financial specifications of the European energy 
market, to assess whether the images of the two pipelines can meet the associated 
requirements. Lastly, I suggest the implications this perceived reality has for policy-
making and business operations in the oil and gas sector. 
Theory
Traditional geopolitics and energy security theories
Traditionally, scholars and policymakers have viewed the need for control over 
natural resources through the prism of conventional geopolitics. The interactions among 
states and private entities over the territory and ownership rights are assumed to be a 
competition for gaining access to natural resource wealth (Amineh and Houweling, 
2007: 368). In general, geopolitics signifies the “competitive zero-sum game played by 
nation-states in their pursuit of power and security on the cartographic landscape” 
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(Hayes and Victor, 2005: 6). From this perspective, any gains achieved by a state are 
necessary interpreted in relation to losses incurred by other competitors. 
The geopolitics of energy has become a coined concept. The public, the media 
and policymakers freely employ terms such as “pipeline wars” or “pipeline race” to 
illustrate the competition for scarce resources (see for example, Victor et al., 2006, or 
Baev and Overland, 2010). Classical geopolitical theory identifies military capability as 
the central element of the state’s power, and because in most cases energy markets are 
not institutionally nor physically separated from states and state powers, geopolitical 
competition in the energy sector often involves the potential threat of activation of 
military capability – a traditional hard power tool that has been commonly employed in 
the past.
It is within this framework of traditional geopolitics that energy security is most 
commonly studied, even though energy security is a conceptually-diverse umbrella term 
that stretches among many dimensions, from political, to engineering, to geological and 
environmental. There is great multitude of conceptualizations of energy security. 
According to a recent count, there are approximately 45 different definitions of energy 
security (see for example: Sovacool, 2011: 3-7; Chester, 2010, 889-890) – some that 
vary in minor nuances, while some employ entirely different frames of analysis that 
vary from political, to economic, social and geological approaches. To take into account 
the various elements of energy security, it is most useful to think of it in terms of a 
system:
“Energy security refers  to a resilient  energy system. This resilient system would be 
capable  of  withstanding  threats  through  a  combination  of  active,  direct  security 
measures – such as surveillance and guards – and passive or more indirect measures – 
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such as redundancy, duplication of critical equipment, diversity in fuel, other sources of 
energy, and reliance on less vulnerable infrastructure” (Brown et al. 2003: 7).
 The widespread consensus is that energy security is a fuzzy concept which can 
be defined in various terms, but that overall it is an “umbrella term that covers many 
concerns linking energy, economic growth and political power” (Cambridge Energy 
Research Associates, 2006: 9).
The abundance of the usage of “energy security” in various contexts of modern 
political and public lexicon has made the concept mean many things at once – a 
conceptual mistake which ultimately threatens to make the term banal or even not mean 
anything at all. While some scepticism regarding the usefulness and meaningfulness of 
the term “energy security” exist, its critiques largely reflect the doubt of whether 
“energy makes security banal – whether, in other words, it still makes sense to talk of 
security given how wildly diverse its meanings, objects and subjects have become with 
the addition of energy” (Ciuta, 2010: 125). It is important to note that this critique does 
not challenge the relationship between energy and security, but rather the unreflectivity 
of the term, which makes it difficult to operationalise.
Yet, while critics rightfully scold at the conceptual fallacy of this vast concept, 
the term energy security – due to a lack of usable alternatives – continues to dominate 
energy and security studies. It is therefore critical to examine the various interpretations 
and dimensions of energy security that dominate the European discursive space, since 
they carry serious consequences for social practice and the direction of foreign and 
domestic policies. Below is a brief overview of some of the most prominent definitions 
of energy security that have been naturalised by the European discursive space. 
A more economic perspective sees energy security as “reliable and adequate 
supply of energy at reasonable prices” (Bielecki, 2002: 237). This definition positions 
13
energy security as the product of the interplay between supply and demand factors 
under given market conditions that preclude what prices are to be considered reasonable 
and what supply is adequate, since both of these terms yield variations in interpretation. 
From a similar economic focus on market behaviour comes the famous definition that 
energy security is the “loss of economic welfare that may occur as a result of a change 
in price or availability of energy” (Bohi and Toman, 1996: 1). Notions of adequate 
supply, reasonable pricing and reliable functioning of international energy markets are 
always incorporated in all economic perspectives on energy security.  
A key factor behind these market-centric definitions is the assumption that 
energy markets are largely liberalized, which renders energy security to be expressed in 
market terms (Chester, 2010: 889). This leads to a conclusion that energy insecurity can 
“then be linked to situations when energy markets do not function properly” and this 
problem can be avoided with strategies aimed at “making markets work” (Noel, 2008), 
such as independent and competitive markets, with only a slight oversight of market 
regulators. From this viewpoint, energy security suffers from market unpredictability; 
hence, the security problem can be managed with greater predictability and reduced 
volatility of energy markets within a more stable economic environment. 
Expanding the economic perspectives on energy security, is the perception that 
while the global energy market may be to a high degree self-regulating, it is not safe-
defending, implying that energy security also involves the assurance of safe 
transportation and supply of energy (Pascual, 2010; Luft, 2009). This perspective 
focuses on risks that may affect the physical security of energy outside the traditional 
supply and demand factors and assumes a conventional geopolitical perspective. As a 
result, energy security is conceptualised as “reliability of supply, access to the energy 
resources in sufficient amounts, affordability, and protection from energy supply 
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interruptions” (Luft, 2009: 5). In particular, threats stemming from terrorism, piracy and 
intra-state and regional warfare are some of the most common traditional security 
concerns.   
Additionally to economic and traditional security approaches, conceptualisation 
of energy security also involves a geological dimension, which extends from the 
simplest question of physical availability of energy resources to the more complex 
questions of accessibility of necessary technology and knowledge of adequate 
extraction, refining and transportation methods (Sovacool, 2011). Physical endowment 
and technological solutions are key components of reliability and determinants of 
affordability that constitute the basic elements of market-centric approach described 
above. 
Additionally, in the recent decade environmental concerns became reflected in 
the conceptualization of energy security. The annual World Energy Assessment journal 
notes that energy security is “availability of energy at all times in various forms, in 
sufficient quantities and at affordable prices without unacceptable or irreversible impact 
on the environment” (UNDP, 2004: 42). Although this approach has been less 
prominent due to its long-term outlook, the explosions on the Japanese nuclear plants in 
March 2011 primed environmental considerations in energy security studies, and it is 
therefore possible to predict that this approach is likely to gain increased importance 
already in the short-term. 
Finally, the term energy security carries a political dimension, reflecting the 
necessity for agreements on energy supply and transit at governmental levels to 
facilitate “the well-being of [the] citizens and the proper functioning of the economy” 
(EC, 2000: 1-2). This dimension acknowledges the above-mentioned economic, 
physical, ecological and geological risks to energy security, but argues that under 
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existing conditions of complex institutional arrangements of contemporary energy 
markets, “these risks will not be ameliorated or prevented without government 
intervention through policy and/or regulatory action” (Chester, 2010: 890). This view of 
energy security is particularly evident in the treatment of the concept by the European 
Commission, which pursues a policy of top-down regulation of the market, as is evident 
by the extensive EU legislation currently in force (for an overview see: DG ENER, 
2011). The European Union has committed itself to incorporating energy security into 
its domestic politics by pursuing policies based on market interdependence, unification 
of the European energy market, and long-term governance improvements in oil and gas 
producing states (Youngs, 2009).
The Russian Federation is another entity that treats the concept of energy 
security from a highly political standpoint, as is evident by the structure of the energy 
sector, its close ties to the state, the country’s national security and foreign policy 
concepts. According to Vladimir Putin, “the new policies of leading nations must be 
based upon an understanding that globalization of the energy sector is inseparable from 
energy security” and that in order to provide for energy security it is necessary to 
“coordinate the actions of all global stakeholders” (Putin, 2006). 
Taking into account the various dimensions of the concept of energy security, it 
was a natural progression to operationalise the concept to make it quantifiable and to 
allow for systematic measuring of various risks and factors mentioned above and to 
assess policy effectiveness. Such quantitative assessment became particularly popular in 
early 2000s. This was achieved by the “translation of the [energy security] definition 
into short-term (operational) and long-term (adequacy) threats to supply disruptions 
based on sources of energy supplies, and subsequent transit, storage and delivery” 
(Chester, 2010: 889). For these purposes, for example, the Shannon-Wiener index for 
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measuring ecological diversity has been extended to include indicators measuring 
energy supply and source diversity, intensity of energy demand, import dependency and 
political and social stability in relevant export, transit and demand states (Neumann, 
2007; Chester, 2010). Additional indexes of varying complexity have been used in 
attempts to reduce the concept’s conceptual ambiguity into an operational value (see for 
example: Kruyt et al., 2009; Chang and Liang Lee, 2008). In practice, however, these 
quantitative approaches are rarely employed, apart from their marginal use by the UK 
Government in relation to oil security (Kruyt et al., 2009). 
Ultimately, while a comprehensive recapitulation of all conceptualizations and 
dimensions of energy security is beyond the scope of this paper, the key notion is that 
the “concept of energy security is inherently slippery because it is polysemic in nature, 
capable of holding multiple dimensions and taking on different specificities depending 
on the country (or continent), timeframe or energy source to which it is applied” 
(Chester, 2010: 887). This ambiguity of the concept makes it highly convenient for 
strategic advancement of particular goals, employment of various policies and 
ultimately, legitimization of political actions. The term is therefore employable in many 
practical situations in international relations and domestic politics to further core 
governmental priorities. 
If we were to take a step back from the theoretical conceptualization of the term 
“energy discourse” and apply the concept to the practice of international relations and 
business operations in the energy sector, it becomes evident that pinning down the exact 
meaning of this elusive term is insignificant in itself. The true importance of the 
definition lies in its ability to identify threats and even more crucially, to legitimize 
policies to counter perceived threats. In other words, in practice the conceptualization of 
energy security is important insofar as it is able to suggest the course of policy action 
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and justify it. Due to the polysemic nature of the concept “energy security,” the term 
cannot be considered a practical unit of measurement, since it includes a broad variety 
of dimensions and is bound by context and time. Instead, in practice the term becomes a 
tool for construction and justification of foreign policy and energy policy actions. 
As a result, while researchers disagree on, and policy-makers prefer to avoid, the 
issue of what is energy security, there is remarkably a notable consensus on how to 
achieve it. The concept’s blithe appearance in literature and official documents over the 
past decade almost always occurs in the realm of foreign policy and geopolitical studies. 
“This preponderance with geopolitics infers that the international or global realm is the 
only legitimate or relevant space for discourse about energy security” (Chester, 2010: 
889; Grant, 2008). Since the energy crises of the 1970s, the primary focus for the 
Western industrial countries was on securing energy supply through geopolitical 
methods (Cambridge Energy Research Associates, 2006: 9). Since then, energy security 
in most cases is perceived through zero-sum game lenses. It almost always occurs 
within a discourse of competition, where enhanced energy security of one actor is 
achieved at a cost to security of another actor. A prime example today is the “New 
Great Game” in Central Asia, which has been described as a competition between 
Western powers – United States, United Kingdom and NATO in particular – against 
Russia, China and other countries of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization for 
influence over petroleum-rich Central Asian states (Edwards, 2003). 
Similarly, the gas relationship between Russia and the European Union (or the 
Russia-EU-Ukraine triangle) has often been viewed through the similar zero-sum game 
prism, while involved actors exhibit a strong tendency to act accordingly (see for 
example, Samokhvalov, 2007). Even following the assertion that the EU-Russia gas 
relationship is in fact characterized by a high degree of mutual dependency, which 
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renders the zero-sum game logic inapplicable to this situation, involved parties have 
nonetheless continued their customary geopolitical approaches. Instead of seeking joint 
enhancement of their interdependent energy security, each partner has increased its 
focus on alternative solutions to its energy needs in order to benefit its position within 
the zero-sum game. Russia began to actively expand its Eastern vector of exports (see 
for example Gromov, 2010), while the EU has increased its LNG imports, exploration 
of unconventional gas supplies and pushed for alternative energy scenarios. Clearly, 
each side exhibits unease about the notion of interdependence with a partner that has 
been traditionally perceived to be a competitor. The traditional, geopolitical zero-sum 
game approach, therefore, appears to be deeply rooted in the gas trade between Russia 
and the EU. 
Critical geopolitics and securitisation theories
Despite its abundant usage in modern political, scholarly and popular lexicon, 
traditional approaches to geopolitics have been systematically and successfully 
challenged. The discipline of traditional geopolitics assumes a division of the 
international anarchical arena into political units – states – separated by boundaries that 
identify and limit the spheres of political powers. But in the context of an increasingly 
globalized world, in which traditional power leverages are capable of reaching and 
affecting societies well beyond the borders of established political entities and in which 
the boundaries between the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of states is blurred, traditional 
geopolitics can no longer rely on simple division of the international environment into 
political jurisdictions encircled by boundaries. With dangers to state sovereignty no 
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longer limited to the traditional military threats, it becomes logical to go beyond the 
narrow view of “space and security, territory and threats” of a state-centric environment 
(Tuathail, 2000: 167). Instead of focusing on the physical capacity of boundaries as 
special limiting lines, boundaries become complex constructions, engendered by social 
and political representations that are localized in time and within a specific context, and 
reflect particular social practices (such as treaties and institutions) (Foucher, 1986: 55-
56). 
Boundaries hence become more than static, physical limiting lines and develop 
into a set of practices within a particular discourse. “The study of geopolitics in 
discursive terms, therefore, is the study of the socio-cultural resources and rules by 
which geographies of international politics get written” (Tuathail and Agnew, 1992: 
193). In other words, traditional and discursive approaches to geopolitics share the same 
ontology, as they both perceive the international arena to be divided between “us” and 
“them.” However, the two approaches differ in their epistemology, particularly in their 
definition of boundaries that separate “us” from “them.” Critical geopolitics, adopted in 
this paper, precludes the existence of ‘objective’ correlation of power and assumes that 
such boundaries are constructed by identifying the “other” through the rhetoric of the 
securitisation process.
Traditionally, the concept of security signifies “some degree of protection of 
values previously acquired” (Wolfers, 1952: 484). Baldwin has made the concept more 
applicable to empirical investigation by defining security as “a low probability of 
damage to acquired values” (Baldwin, 1997: 13). Conventionally, these definitions are 
state-centric, with security studies being closely linked to military approaches. 
Since the end of the Cold War, the concept of security has been significantly 
expanded from its traditional geopolitical frame. With Barry Buzan at the forefront, 
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scholars have both widened and deepened the security studies agenda, by focusing not 
only exclusively on its military cross-border dimension, but also analysing its existence 
within the political, economic, environmental and societal sectors. This paper adopts the 
view on security as presented by the Copenhagen School, which treats the concept 
largely within a constructivist, identity-driven framework. According to this school of 
through, security is “the pursuit of freedom from threat and the ability of states and 
societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity against 
forces of change which they see hostile” (Buzan, 1991: 432). This definition 
acknowledges that security means the perception of survival of a value or an issue – a 
designated referent object – in the face of a presented (constructed) existential threat. 
Hence, no longer is security threat existent per se. It becomes constructed through its 
strategic presentation – through a “securitizing move.” 
Since the publication of Buzan, Waever and de Wilde’s Security: A New 
Framework for Analysis (1998), securitization theory has become a dominant approach 
to security studies. The term securitization refers to an essentially intersubjective 
process through which an audience becomes concerned about its existential values and 
begins to believe that a particular valued referent object is threatened. Securitisation is a 
“set of interrelated practices and the processes of their production, diffusion and 
reception/translation that brings threats into being” (Balzacq, 2011: xiii). The 
securitization perspective removes the objective ground from the discourse and studies 
issues that are perceived as threats, regardless of whether they are threats. Unlike 
traditional approaches to international relations, Liberalism and Realism in particular, 
that identify an objective issue and study its threat to an objective audience, in 
securitization theory threats cannot be separated from the intersubjective 
representations, i.e. discourses, in which the audience exists. 
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The definition of energy security then must follow the same contextualization 
process. Ciuta, for example, argues that the “‘total’ logic of security latent in the energy 
sector does not imply that security means the same thing everywhere: it means that it 
permeates all sectors of activity and draws in actors from all levels, within a context” 
(2010: 126). This implies that energy security approaches – as identified previously 
within the traditional geopolitical boundaries – can be useful analytical concepts but 
only under the condition that their creation and application is contextualised, because 
for different societies at different time periods energy security means different things. 
For example, in 1990s, when the European Union actively expanded its common energy 
infrastructure and attempted to diversify links with external suppliers, its energy policies 
were fundamentally economically driven and adhered largely to the market-centric 
definition of energy security. However, since early 2000s, the issue of external energy 
policy of the European Union became politicised and securitised, with Brussels paying 
less attention to market and business motivations (Romanova, 2010: 154). This process 
coincided with multiple changes within the European discursive space, which rendered 
previous economic conceptualisations of energy security to be no longer acceptable and 
demanded for new security constructions. 
Because securitization theory stresses the process through which threats are 
constructed, this approach suggests a whole new relationship between security and 
language. In fact, one definition of securitisation specifies that security is a speech act 
and that “it is by labelling something a security issue that it becomes one” (Waever, 
2004: 13). “For securitization theory, language is not only concerned with what is ‘out 
there’ as mainstream theories of International Relations hold, but is also constitutive of 
world politics” (Balzacq, 2011: xiii). Hence, the action that is able to transform objects 
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into an existential threats, actors into enemies and issues into existential values is 
communication1. 
Securitisation or de-securitisation can occur only within a society and only 
through one’s own participation in the dominant discourse and political practice of that 
society. “A securitizing actor is someone, or a group, who performs the security speech 
act” to declare a referent object to be existentially threatened (Buzan et al., 1998: 36-
40). The survival of these actors usually is not directly threatened by the reference 
object. Instead, they usually focus on the need to defend the security of the people, the 
nation, the state, a system, a principle, or some other large element deemed to be 
important and valued by the audience. The most prominent and common examples of 
securitising actors are political leaders, governments, pressure groups, firms and other 
bureaucracies. For this reason, the application of securitisation theory in IR most often 
takes a state-centric and hegemonic approach to security issues, with states considered 
to be the main units of analysis within a global pattern of security relationships.
It is important to note that the designation of “actor” is to a degree arbitrary, 
because the same security speech act can be attributed to actors on different levels, e.g. 
a message from a politician can be attributed to a political system, bureaucracy or that 
specific individual independently. Nonetheless, regardless of the difficulty in accurate 
identification of securitising actors, their power to initiate and maintain processes that 
construct society’s perceived threats and define accepted methods for their solutions 
points to the existence and observance of particular inter-societal hierarchical relations 
that enable such domination. In other words, securitisation act implicitly identifies 
dominance and power relations within a society. 
Securitisation theory carries serious implications for the practice of politics. 
Securitising a referent object entails that this object will be removed from the normal 
1 Defined for the purposes of this paper as all forms of written or spoken texts
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bounds of customary procedures. Buzan et al. observed that “security is the move that 
takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a 
special kind of politics or as above politics” (1998: 23). This carries significant 
implications regarding legitimate ways to manage the threat. Securitising a referent 
object and its elevation beyond politics opens many doors to possible policy reactions 
(e.g. legitimises torture and murder or temporary marginalisation of other values). This 
paradigm applies not only to states, as this can also be observed among different levels 
of systems – the church, family, private organizations, and so on. 
Additionally, this theory carries significant consequences for the allocation of 
responsibility for security provision and management. Traditional approaches to 
security studies assign political leaders the responsibility to manage existing threats and 
in cases of failure, hold political leaders accountable for their inability to adequately 
respond to them. Because the securitisation theory, by contrast, does not assume an 
existence of threat outside of discourse, political leaders are seen to construct security 
threats and legitimise methods to respond to them. Hence, they are responsible for the 
creation of threats, as well as for their subsequent legitimate management.  
Critical Discourse Analysis 
Assuming a securitisation theory perspective, it emerges that the success of the 
securitisation process is highly contingent upon effective use of language, or in other 
words an ability of the securitising actor to persuade his or her audience by identifying 
and exploiting the relevant feelings, needs, values and interests. Effective persuasion 
requires that the actor frames his or her arguments and interpretations within a discourse 
most relevant and dominant for the receiving public. To achieve a perlocutionary effect, 
24
the speaker must identify with the audience and employ the frames that best resonate 
with the audience’s experience (Balzacq, 2011: 9). This theory, therefore, directly 
points to the importance of language and discourse to human identification and 
understanding of threats, as well as legitimation of chosen solutions. Due to the 
dependency of socially perceived threats on the actions of securitising actors, existing 
public discourse and employed language techniques, it becomes natural – almost 
necessary – to establish and describe the close conceptual link between securitisation 
theory and Critical Discourse analysis (CDA). 
Discourse analysis is an approach that enables scientists to study how discursive 
realities and perceptions (including threats) are constructed within a discourse. 
Discourses contribute to the construction of social identities, social relations of power, 
social systems and institutions, and, of special relevance to this paper, of perceptions of 
threats and the legitimate methods to alleviate them. Discourse allows us to identify 
which issues are presented or considered to be security threats, how these constructions 
are developed, and how facts are manipulated to acquire special “meaning that is then 
carried by actors in a particular situation” (Larsen, 1997: 26; Vieira, 2006: 4). In 
alignment with the constructivist theory, discourse analysis postulates that identities, 
social practices, social knowledge and institutions are constructed by and within a 
particular discourse (Torfing, 2006: 3). 
Linguists and social scientists have suggested that an understanding of any given 
word and any given object of physical matter, i.e. the activation of lexical-conceptual 
meanings, occurs through the process of cognitive appraisal, which links new 
information with pre-existing interpretation frames and cognitive models (Lakoff’s 
Idealized Cognitive Model, 1987). Social knowledge, power relations and their 
underlying legitimizations are all discursive elements that are historical and context 
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specific (Fairclough and Wodak, 1997: 271-280). As a result, human understanding of a 
particular reality is constructed based on the discourse within which that reality is 
interpreted. All new information must correlate and “fit” to existing beliefs, otherwise it 
will be simply dismissed. This leads to the conclusion that ideological representations of 
different social phenomena and objective reality – which (and not the objective 
phenomena per se) constitute socially-accepted reality – are constructed by and within 
existing discourses. The way that these pre-existing discourses interact with new 
information shape societal popular knowledge, establish and legitimise beliefs and 
determine social and political action.
“Critical Discourse Analysis is a political approach to discourse analysis, which 
emphasises the processes that create meaning” (Rogers-Hayden et al., 2011: 135). 
Pioneered by Fairclough, CDA enables scientists to develop a framework for the study 
of language as the key element in the creation of perceived reality. In social sciences, 
CDA methodology is applied “to uncover how language works to construct meanings 
that signify people, objects and events in the world in specific ways. It is concerned 
with the way in which discourse builds social identities, social relations and systems of 
knowledge or belief and how these discourses maintain power through their ideological 
properties” (Brookes, 1995: 462). 
A particular attention of CDA is given to the analysis of tensions among 
discourses for domination within a society. In order for a discourse to gain hegemony, 
i.e. to become ‘naturalised’ within a given social system, it must “succeed in making its 
own rules/systems/beliefs appear to be the ‘natural’ ones; and contribute to the 
deactivation of ‘projects’ which work against it” (Rogers-Hayden et al., 2011: 135). 
“Every system of authority attempts to establish and to cultivate the belief in its 
legitimacy” (Weber, 1977: 325). Because it is through language that humans perceive, 
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accept or challenge reality, language ipso facto is an instrument for legitimization. In 
the case of the Nabuco-South-Stream conundrum, there is a clear competition among 
the discourses of the Nabucco consortium and Gazprom (by extension, the Russian 
state) over hegemony in the European discourse pertinent to energy security. Analysing 
this competition from a CDA perspective involves examining how these discourses are 
used to challenge or exploit existing dominant beliefs, construct new myths and 
persuade the audience to alter their pre-existing perceptions of reality. 
Because CDA is closely interlinked with the notions of domination, a key 
element of the approach is the interrelationship between power and language. Normal 
Fairclough (1992) has suggested a famous three-dimensional framework of CDA for the 
study of discourse (perceived reality) creation. The model consists of an analysis of 
three concurrent elements: an examination of discursive products (texts); a study of how 
texts are interpreted within discursive practices and simultaneously produce them; and 
finally, how these texts become situated within the greater context of its discursive 
space and hence, how they contribute to the interpretation of socially-accepted reality 
and social practice. This approach implies that the meaning of texts is produced within a 
wider social context – and that the meaning of texts influences the wider social context 
(under the condition that these texts succeed in gaining dominance). The practical usage 
of CDA is described in greater detail in the methodology section of the paper, as CDA 
is used to examine documentary evidence to understand the discursive competition 
between Nabucco and South Stream pipelines over legitimate domination of the 
European discourse on energy security, and hence, to guarantee their right to survival. 
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Theories of legitimacy, public relations and public diplomacy 
Because securitisation is a linguistic process carried out by particular actors 
holding the power to initiate and manage the process and targeted at the conforming 
mass public, securitisation theory corresponds closely to Max Weber’s traditional 
studies of legitimate domination and contemporary studies of public relations. 
In his famous book Economy and Society (1922), Weber elaborated on the 
concepts of domination and legitimate authority, focusing specifically on the factors that 
allow these powers to be acceptably exercised. He coined the term Herrschaft – roughly 
translated as domination by the virtue of authority with implied voluntary compliance 
(see for example Ibid, pages 941-946): 
“To be more specific, domination will thus mean the situation in which the manifested 
will (command) of the ruler or rulers is meant to influence the conduct of one or more 
others (the ruled) and actually does influence it is such a way that their conduct to a 
socially relevant degree occurs as if the ruled had made the content of the command the 
maxim of their conduct for its very own sake” (Ibid: 946). 
According to Weber, legitimate domination is achieved when the society 
believes in the myths that are created and cultivated by the ruler(s) (as opposed to the 
myths being actually true). This points to the constructivist nature of legitimacy 
(Suchman, 1995) and indicates that continuous production of correct messages and their 
successful communication can ultimately make an organisation appear legitimate and 
allow it to legitimately exercise domination over its environment.  
According to Weber, legitimacy is socially constructed and all individuals and 
organisations seek to achieve and maintain legitimacy to ensure existence and provide 
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for longevity. This can be achieved by either of the three principles: the legal-rational 
legitimation; traditional legitimation; and charismatic legitimation (Weber, 1922; also 
see Wearaas, 2009). Legal-rational legitimation seeks to demonstrate and assure that 
socially-accepted rationality is implemented in every aspect and at every level of the 
system. Assuming that society embraces rationality, people are more likely to accept 
domination of a system that works within the framework of existing rules and accepted 
rationality principles. In practice, this means that organisations will seek to justify their 
existence by proving the legality and rationality of their operations within a specific 
context, giving prominence in communication to enacted regulations and laws and 
demonstrating its adherence.
Traditional legitimation is based on an established belief in the sanctity of 
immemorial traditions. It stipulates that through a continuous cultivation of a perception 
of authority among the citizens, the individual or institution receive legitimation. 
Simply put, this system legitimises authority on the basis that it always has been there in 
that form. 
Finally, the charismatic legitimation rests on the perception that the leader 
exhibits some sort of exceptional heroism, character or sanctity and is endowed with 
exceptional powers or qualities. Charisma can be inherited or it can be artificially 
produced in a person or institution through some extraordinary means. Additionally, 
charisma can be depersonalised to make it apply to institutions and systems either 
through the transfer of charisma from an individual with pre-existing charismatic 
legitimation or by cultivating charisma of an organization as a whole, focusing on its 
unique qualities and extraordinary contributions to society.
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Upon closer look, the seemingly more general purpose of public relations – to 
establish good long-term relations with relevant stakeholders2 – fundamentally rests on 
the same concept of legitimate domination outlined by Weber. Public relations seek to 
facilitate business operations of an organisation and their long-term success. To achieve 
this, the practice seeks to establish mutually beneficial relationships between the 
organisation and the relevant stakeholders in order to reduce resistance to the 
organisation’s operations. Formally, this purpose is defined as: 
“the  management  function  that  establishes  and  maintains  mutually  beneficial 
relationships between an organisation and the various publics on whom its success and 
failure depends” (Cutlip et al. 1994: 6, italics added). 
Although traditional definitions of public relations purposefully omit mentioning 
domination or authority, these concepts are inevitably implied, as the term mutually  
beneficial relationship in practice means seeking to influence voluntary compliance 
from the environment by cultivating particular perceptions and beliefs regarding 
organisation’s operations. All traditional definitions of public relations indicate that 
establishing these relationships must be a separate managerial function involved in 
strategic management, which entails that ultimately, one of the key tasks of an 
organization is to influence the environment in which it operates (Dozier et al., 1995; 
Vercic, 2009; Podnar et al. 2009). In other words, organisations seek to legitimise their 
domination “by the virtue of authority” – by adjusting their communications to the 
discourses in which their publics operate in order to make their messages appear 
legitimate and be voluntarily accepted. 
2 A stakeholder is defined as a public, whose opinion and behaviour are important for the existence and 
success of an organisation, such as shareholders, customers, legislators, pressure groups and so on.  
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 “Existing as an organisation and conducting business is a sort of privilege that 
must be justified” (Waeraas, 2009: 310). Because organisations – and this is especially 
applicable to large transnational corporations involved in exploiting natural resources – 
continuously seek to acquire and increase their share of society’s resources, they are 
inevitably faced with the necessity to influence the perceptions and beliefs of the society 
to secure their legitimate existence. This need becomes particularly apparent when an 
organisation is faced with criticism from its stakeholders.  
Assuming Weber’s definition of legitimacy as the justification of one’s right to 
exist, it becomes imperative that any formal system must strive to achieve legitimacy 
and that it must continue to “base its existence on a principle of legitimation, either the 
legal-rational, traditional, or the charismatic” (Waeraas, 2009: 301). This is very similar 
to the central postulate of public relations that states that “all business in a democratic 
country begins with public permission and exists by public approval” (Arthur W. Page, 
1939).
Despite the clear connection between Weber’s concepts of legitimacy and 
legitimation with the practice and purpose of public relations, there exists only a handful 
of scholars who have studied and demonstrated these similarities and links (see for 
example Wearaas, 2009: 309). Public relations literature tends to focus on the practice 
and techniques of strategic communication for specific business purposes and is less 
preoccupied with specifically defining and analysing their theoretical implications. 
Instead, the field most often is satisfied with a general objective of ‘obtaining good 
relations’ or establishing a long term ‘positive reputation.’ Instead of focusing on the 
very theoretical and abstract concept of legitimacy, public relations gives precedence to 
the similarly constructed, but much more intuitive concepts that appear in everyday 
settings, such as image and reputation. Legitimacy becomes an important issue for 
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public relations practitioners only when its application to an organisation or individual 
becomes questioned. 
This is clearly a theoretical shortcoming for the field of public relations. Indeed, 
the conceptual leap from the traditional objectives of public relations, i.e. establishing 
good relations with the stakeholders, and the theory of legitimacy is rather small. One 
may easily defend an argument that in fact the main purpose of strategic 
communications is to obtain and preserve legitimacy and to further expand legitimate 
domination. Only a handful of scholars have observed this link. Of those who did, the 
idea emerged that “establishing and maintaining organisational legitimacy is at the core 
of most, in not all, public relations activities” (Metzler, 2001: 321).
In alignment with Max Weber’s theories of domination, authority and power, the 
discourse around Nabucco and South Stream projects is interpreted as a competition to 
acquire domination by virtue of their contribution to energy security. In essence, we can 
observe a competition between the two pipelines and their relevant transnational 
corporations for a justified right to exist within the European discursive space. Because 
legitimacy is socially constructed, the potential for acquiring legitimacy can be found in 
the citizens’ perceptions and beliefs. In this case, the public beliefs regarding energy 
security play the key role in the competition, as they determine which project is seen as 
a better solution to the perceived energy security dilemma.
Because in the case of Nabucco and South Stream – as is applicable also to all 
strategies of world’s major energy companies exhibiting close links to the state – 
communication campaigns are cross-border and are closely linked to government 
foreign policies, this type of international public relations closely corresponds to public 
diplomacy. The theoretical roots of public diplomacy have originated in the classical 
public relations. Propelled by globalisation, there emerged a belief that PR techniques 
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used domestically by individuals, organisations and political bodies can also be 
employed by governments and multinational corporations to influence the perceptions 
and attitudes of publics abroad. Today, public diplomacy is generally defined as 
activities of a government or a transnational corporation “reaching out to a public or 
polity to explain its cultures, values, policies, beliefs and, by association, to improve its 
relationship, image and reputation with that country” (Taylor, 2008: 53).
Public diplomacy – just as domestic public relations – techniques are powerful 
tools to amend and influence public opinion, but in isolation, they should not be 
considered to be all-powerful tools. Unlike domestic public relations, where an 
organisation’s PR efforts and messages can be mediated by the media, word of mouth 
and personal interaction, in international public diplomacy the media largely plays the 
most important role, as there is usually little opportunities for governments to influence 
consistently the latter two in foreign countries. This leaves the “media (and not just the 
news media but, potentially, almost all types of media including comedy, soaps, movies 
and more) as a potential tool of influence” (Taylor, 2008: 58).
International practice illustrates that it is exceptionally hard, if not impossible, to 
change public perception of an organisation or a country without any changes in the 
behaviour of that entity. For example, in mid-2000s, Russia hired an internationally 
renowned PR agency Ketchum to influence the coverage of Russia in British and US 
newspapers. While the company succeeded in delivering quantitative outputs of 
favourably slanted commentary and analysis, the Western media and, by association, 
public opinion nonetheless remained relatively unsympathetic toward Russia (Taylor, 
2008: 54). The inability of Ketchum to exert any substantial influence over Western 
public and policymakers’ opinions of Russia is arguably an illustration of the country’s 
serious disconnect between “what the Russian government does and says in the 
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domestic arena and the image that the Kremlin is trying to project to international 
audiences” (Avgerinos, 2009). As a result, the discrepancy only reinforced the cognitive 
dissonance theory, which suggests that people have a tendency not to accept or believe 
information that is inconsistent with their pre-existing ideas and beliefs (Cooper et al., 
1984:230). This caused Western audiences to dismiss new frames for analysis and 
interpretation of policy developments, and rather resort to their pre-existing perceptions 
and Cold War interpretation frames. 
While there are plenty of examples to illustrate the limitations of public relations 
and public diplomacy techniques, there is also a successful track record of their timely 
and effective incorporations into the nation’s foreign policy. An example commonly 
quoted in textbooks is the American decision not to continue its military invasion into 
Baghdad during the first Gulf war. The commanders rightfully assessed that aside from 
possible military difficulties and even a risk of failure, this decision could cause the 
coalition, which also included Muslim and Arab forces, to fall apart due to the 
unpopularity of such option among the Muslim publics (Taylor, 2008: 54). 
Ultimately, while public relations and the subsequent public diplomacy efforts 
cannot independently sway the foreign public and policymakers to alter radically their 
perceptions of a country or a multinational organisation without consistent change in the 
latter’s both domestic and international policies and behaviour, these techniques 
nonetheless have the potential to exert significant influence over foreign policies and 
business operations in both positive and negative sense. As the result, the conclusion 
found in most nations’ foreign ministries’ offices is that effective diplomacy today 
consists of traditional hard power approaches, such as the use or threatening use of 
military strength, together with public diplomacy techniques, such as the softer power of 
cultural, educational and economic tools. In companies, this translates into a marketing 
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campaign that consistently and directly correlates with a public relations campaign 
tailored to suit the characteristics of the pertinent publics and stakeholders in each 
relevant country. 
Nabucco – South Stream project overview 
European security fears 
Despite the fact that the European Union today is yet far from being monolithic, 
there are various examples of instances in which policy-makers on the EU level have 
demonstrated an ability to reach a consensus on the identification and interpretation of 
security threats. For example, the process through which the Southern Mediterranean 
region became a geopolitical area of concern for Europe and was conceived as a threat 
to Europe’s security  illustrates the ability of the EU-level policy-makers to forge a top-
down discourse that has securitised a region and that consequently has determined and 
legitimised political, economic and humanitarian actions (Vieira, 2006). However, the 
key pillar of European Union domestic unity and global influence has been its economic 
dimension, rather than political or military power. Only recently the EU has 
demonstrated itself as a rising actor in international affairs, with growing influence not 
only in the sphere of economic relations, but also in security issues (Vieira, 2006: 1-2). 
Within this context, Nabucco is one of the key pan-European projects today that 
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ventures into new policy ground and hence, since its inception in 2002, the project has 
consistently been primed as that of critical importance.
From the first days of the European venture, energy issues have been at the heart 
of EU policy, with some of the primary fundamentals of the Union formalised in the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC Treaty, 1951) and the European Atomic 
Energy Community (Euratom Treaty, 1957). To support the aims of its energy policy, 
the EU has been creating market-based tools (mainly tax schemes, subsidies and the 
CO2 emissions trading programme), developing common energy technologies 
(especially technologies for energy efficiency and renewable or low-carbon energy) and 
establishing community financial instruments. An abundance of regulations, green 
papers, strategies and communications provide the legislative and regulatory framework 
that in theory is intended to enforce and oversee compliance. 
Regardless of this, however, today, the role of Brussels in creating and 
governing a single energy policy for its member states is very limited. While the 
European Commission continues to issue recommendations and green papers to 
encourage its Member States to ‘speak with one voice,’ in practice the EU gas market 
and the region’s energy interests are far from monolithic, and as of yet, the EU does not 
exercise full control over this issue. These governance problems have created a general 
understanding that the formulation and implementation of a full-fledged European 
energy policy within the next years is unlikely, which has compelled Brussels to focus 
rather on leading the process of “incremental cohesion of internal and external measures 
on energy issues” (Baumann, 2010: 83).
Within this process, the Commission is clearly pushing to extend its powers over 
the energy sector. In this sense, the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2010 has been 
an important achievement, as it increased potential leverage of Brussels over the 
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common energy policy. The Treaty partially re-delegated the issue of energy to the 
usual ordinary co-decision procedure requiring qualified majority voting (QMV), as 
opposed to the previous requirement of unanimity3 (TFEU, Art. 194). However, taking 
into account the differences among 27 Member States, even reaching the qualified 
majority often proves to be an exceptionally difficult task. Because of the immense 
diversity of energy mixes, different suppliers and different political legacies, member 
states rhetorically agree on the need for a coordinated energy policy, but significantly 
diverge in their perceptions on the degree of necessary and possible coordination. As a 
result, there is no single agreement on whether the common initiative should provide 
merely for a loose cohesion, or go as far as to offer concrete common energy security 
measures (Goldthau and Witte, 2009: 379). 
Following the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty and the subsequent 
administrative and leadership changes, the multiplicity of actors taking part in EU 
energy policy-making is vast and confusing. The Commission – and specifically 
Commissioner for Energy and his or her Directorate General together with the President 
of the Commission, the High Representative together with his or her External Action 
Service (EAS), the Council and the President of the Council all have some sort of 
competency when it comes to determining, negotiating, executing and evaluating 
European energy policy. The hierarchy and division of competencies at the EU-level are 
not yet settled and confusing even to many European policy-makers. When it comes to 
the relationship between Russia and Brussels, it is unclear with whom contracts should 
be signed, and it becomes logistically and economically more beneficial and efficient to 
work bilaterally with member states and their respective energy ministries and 
3 QMV applies to issues related to the functioning of the energy market, security of supply, promotion of 
energy efficiency and energy saving, promotion of the development of new and renewable forms of 
energy, and the promotion of the interconnection of energy networks. However, unanimity of the Council 
is still required for energy measures that are primarily of fiscal nature. 
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companies (some of which also retain close links to state) (Leonard and Popescu, 2007). 
Administrative complexities are paralleled by the divisions in perspectives towards 
Russia among the old and new Member States.
Aside from these institutional complexities, negotiating a common energy policy 
is also difficult because each country has different energy priorities, uses a different 
energy mix and is dependent on different supplies in different degrees (Baumann and 
Simmerl, 2011). When one, for example, compares the differences between Italy and 
Slovakia, the problem of harmonising energy policy becomes evident. While in Italy the 
total primary energy supply derived from natural gas constitutes approximately 35 
percent of the country’s energy mix, only 16 percent of this gas comes from Russia. In 
Slovakia, on the other hand, 30 percent of the energy mix is natural gas, with 100 
percent of it imported from Russia. As a result, member states have chosen to retain 
control over their energy supplies and co-operation in energy sector has remained an 
intergovernmental process. EU member states have already made it clear that they 
would not tolerate interference with national sovereignty, especially when it comes to 
taking sensitive political decisions such as opting for nuclear power or deciding which 
energy suppliers to choose (van Hecke, 2007). These differences and lack of apparent 
will from many national officials have prompted some scholars to believe that the pleas 
of member states for common action are often “superficial” (Baumann and Simmerl, 
2011: 3). 
The internal diversity among European member states translates into a 
cacophony of approaches to the development of a single external energy policy and 
specifically, to the question of how to deal with Russia’s dominant position in the 
Union’s natural gas market. The recent study by the European Council on Foreign 
Relations (ECFR) has identified five distinct policy approaches to Russia: 
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− “Trojan Horses – Cyprus and Greece, who often defend Russian 
interests in the EU system and are willing to veto common EU positions;
− Strategic Partners – France, Germany, Italy and Spain, who enjoy a 
‘special relationship’ with Russia which occasionally undermines 
common EU policies;
− Friendly Pragmatists – Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Slovakia and Slovenia, who maintain a 
close relationship with Russia and tend to put their business interests 
above political goals;
− Frosty Pragmatists – Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland, 
Latvia, the Netherlands, Romania, Sweden and the United Kingdom, 
who also focus on business interests but are less afraid than others to 
speak out against Russian behaviour on human rights or other issues; 
− And the New Cold Warriors – Lithuania and Poland, who have an 
overtly hostile relationship with Moscow and are willing to use the veto 
to block EU negotiations with Russia” (Leonard and Popescu, 2007: 8).
These perception differences are clearly seen in policy and behaviour. For 
example, the countries of the EU-15 are willing to embrace Russia as a strategic partner 
as is evident for example by Nord Stream or the extensive Italian-Russian cooperation 
in the natural gas sector. The new EU member states that were formerly under the 
influence of the Soviet Union4 (EU-8) do not seek such cooperation as actively as their 
Western counterparts (although, it should be noted that following the ‘re-set’ of US-
Russian relations, the tensions between these countries and Russia significantly 
4 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia 
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decreased). Instead, countries of EU-8 opt to choose policies that are designed to bypass 
Russia, as is exemplified by their dedication to the Nabucco pipeline or endeavour to 
build liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals in the Baltic states. 
Ultimately, European member states are divided in their approach and 
perception of Russia and Gazprom according to their national identities, mentalities, 
historic legacies and current economic and energy status. Under these conditions, a 
common EU approach to Russia impossible to achieve. Drawing on these divisions, a 
number of scholars have asserted that “Moscow’s divide-and-conquer tactics have 
successfully prevented greater inter-European cooperation on both economic and 
security issues,” which in turn has produced a significant threat to member states’ 
energy security (Smith, 2010: 1). In academic circles, political communication and mass 
media rhetoric, this “divide-and-conquer” approach has gained prominence and has 
been widely used, causing it to enter the popular European discourse around Russia and 
become ‘conventional wisdom.’ Yet, this approach bluntly oversees the fact that 
divisions among EU member states have already existed, exist and will continue to exist 
even without Moscow’s influence and within all issues, even those not pertaining to 
Russia or foreign policy in general (as for example has been exemplified by the Lisbon 
Treaty saga). Moscow does not “divide-and-conquer.” Rather it manipulates and 
exploits existing divisions in order to further its own national interests. While this 
certainly poses problems for European unity, the inconsistency of perceptions and 
approaches to Moscow by different EU Member States pushes Kremlin and Gazprom to 
seek more secure bilateral contracts with individuals European states that are more 
willing to cooperate (Neuman, 2010: 8).
These perceptions are explained in part by the fact that new EU member states 
virtually entirely depend on Russian gas deliveries – the Baltics import almost 100 
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percent of their gas demand, Poland and Czech Republic more than two-thirds. Because 
the size of their markets is at the same time much smaller than their Western European 
counterparts – Poland’s annual consumption is about 14 bcm, Slovakia’s less than 6 
bcm and the Baltics average less than 3 bcm (compared to Germany’s almost 90 bcm 
market) –their gas supplies depend to a significant extent on the contracting policies of 
the European heavyweights, such as Germany (Goldthau, 2008: 687). As a result, these 
states are to a high degree dependent on the relationship between Russia and the old EU 
member states, which in most cases is perceived as an urgent threat to energy stability 
and security. 
Although the concept of “energy security” is primed throughout a wide range of 
official documents, policy statements and reports issued over the last decade by 
European government and supranational organisations, its use has been rarely 
accompanied by a discussion and almost never by a definition of the meaning of the 
concept (Chester, 2010; Egenhofer et al., 2006). This nonetheless does not hinder the 
creation and mass exploitation of fears regarding reliance on Russian gas. The most 
prominent fear that the Russian elite may use gas as an ‘energy weapon’ in the 
international geopolitical contest (Soderbegh et al., 2010; Umbach, 2010). In 2008, 
“some EU member states even called for an ‘Energy NATO’ to ensure Western supplies 
in case Russia cuts off oil and gas deliveries” (Goldthau, 2008: 687). Ultimately, these 
fears were based on the discourse that presented Russian elite as seeking a favorable 
outcome in a zero-sum game through its gas weapon. The second worry – far less 
pronounced and with little reflection in the mainstream media – is that Russia may no 
longer be able to meets demand of natural gas, due to lack of adequate investments in 
the upstream sector and highly inefficient domestic use of resources (Goldthau, 2008; 
Solanko and Sutela, 2009). 
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There were several reasons why the issue of energy security became politicised 
and securitised in 2000s in the European Union. In contrast to market liberalisation 
going on in EU, Russia did not follow the same path and did not open its territory for 
the free transit of pipelines belonging to Central Asian suppliers. In addition, record 
high energy prices and subsequent repayment by mid-2000s of most of Russia’s 
external debts have provoked an increased self-confidence among the Russian 
leadership. The growing scepticism about the Energy Charter Treaty coupled with 
increased self-confidence prompted Kremlin to seek other, not always economical, ways 
to ensure that its relations with the near abroad adequately suits the country’s energy 
interests. This in turn caused significant deterioration of relations between Russia and 
many of its neighbours, Ukraine and Belarus in particular. The August 2008 proxy war 
between Russia and Georgia reinforced European fears and caused suspicions that 
Russia is seeking – with all available means, including military power – to control 
pipelines outside its own territory to hinder European attempts to diversity its supplies 
of hydrocarbons. This in turn created additional perceived threats for Ukraine and the 
Baltic states, with many voicing fears that Russia can attack these countries in a similar 
manner. The record high natural gas prices further aggravated the fears.
In 2002, when the idea for Nabucco pipeline was initiated by the Austrian gas 
company OMV, it was largely a business project intended to raise capital from gas 
transit and to secure new supplies from the Caspian and the Middle East. Its primary 
purpose was to expand export routes of Caspian natural gas to European consumers and 
hence, the pipeline was to deliver Azeri and Iranian natural gas through Turkey, 
Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary and Austria. The Turkish and Austrian partners expected 
to profit from the lucrative transit fees for moving gas across their territories. Shortly, 
however, Nabucco acquired political meaning when it “won early moral support from 
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Russia sceptics in Central and Eastern Europe, who saw the pipeline as a historic 
opportunity to build a new lifeline to the West while weakening Russia’s grip on them” 
(Erdogu, 2010: 2940). What began as a straightforward economically motivated project, 
quickly transformed into a political construct representing protection against the 
perceived threat posed by Gazprom. 
After several years of negotiations, the Nabucco Gas Pipeline International 
GmbH was established. Its stakeholders are the Austrian OMV, German RWE, 
Hungarian Mol, Romanian Transgaz, Energy Holding of Bulgaria and the Turkish Botas 
companies, each holding 16.67 percent stake. Construction was to start in 2009, with the 
pipe entering the operation phase already in 2012. Maximum capacity was conceived at 
31 billion cubic meters, which would have accounted for about a quarter of Russian 
annual natural gas supplies to Europe. Pipeline’s feasibility study was funded by the 
European Commission, which also in 2007, appointed a former Dutch foreign minister 
Jozias van Aartsen to oversee the project, “giving the pipeline a particularly favoured 
status” (Orban, 2008: 148). Nabucco pipeline was also supported ardently by the United 
States. 
Since its inception in 2004, plans to start construction on the Nabucco pipeline 
have been continuously delayed – most currently until at 2013 – because the consortium 
has no gas supply contracts lined up. At the same time, the costs for the pipeline have 
increased from the initial 7.9 billion Euros estimate in 2004, to 14 billion Euros, as 
commodity prices, especially steel, continue to rise.  
Russian Gazprom
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While the EU represents a rather heterogeneous body with strong variations in 
energy policy preferences among its member states, Russia, on the other hand, has 
formed very clear interests and objectives in its highly centralised energy sector, as well 
as little to none opposition to them. Kremlin has been successful in outlining and 
institutionalising a straightforward energy agenda, making energy security the most 
important element of Russia’s national security programme (Mankoff, 2009:4). Russia’s 
vast energy reserves – natural gas in particular – have become a dominant pillar of the 
Russian economy, a key factor behind the country’s economic recovery and political 
stability, and its most effective foreign policy tool. 
In contrast to the European energy sector, which is experiencing top-down 
pressure to liberalise, Russia has chosen “suboptimal state control of natural resources 
over the frontier capitalism of the 1990s” (van der Meulen, 2009: 833). Immediately 
after Vladimir Putin became the President, the State acquired over 51 percent of 
Gazprom’s shares, while a share offer to increase capital allowed for the involvement of 
new owners, which had an effect of “breaking the security ring built by managers 
appointed during the Yeltsin period” (Stern, 2005: 176). However, Russia’s gas sector is 
nonetheless almost entirely dominated by state-controlled giant Gazprom, which enjoys 
a near monopoly control over the production, transport, distribution and export of 
natural gas. Although today, liberalisation tendencies are evident in the domestic natural 
gas market – with increased market share allocated to private companies, Novatek in 
particular – this process applies only to domestic exploration and production activities. 
Gazprom’s monopoly over transportation of Russian gas to foreign customers is not – 
and in the medium-term is unlikely to be – seriously challenged. 
Since the Soviet Union, Russia has considered its energy sector to be of a 
strategic national importance, crucial for the country’s economic and consequently 
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social and political environments. As a result, Russian federal authorities continue to 
exercise substantial executive power over the natural gas sector, which was successfully 
protected from liberalization during the 1990s, largely by Viktor Chernomyrdin. Energy 
policy is outlined in the Energy Strategy, the most recent one being for the period up to 
2030, approved on 27 August, 2009. The strategy sets up an array of aims across four 
major dimensions: energy security; energy efficiency of domestic economy; economic 
efficiency of national fuel energy complex (FEC); and ecological security of FEC. Key 
emphasis is placed on diversification of natural gas production sites and export 
countries, with a more active role allocated to Russia’s Far East and the Chinese and 
South Asian markets.
The internal structure of the Russian energy sector makes Gazprom and the 
Russian state difficult trade partners due to the large black box of its policymaking. In 
particular, the sector suffers from a weak institutionalisation of the decision-making 
process, the multiplicity of involved actors – many with multiple roles and conflicting 
interests – and the lack of transparency (Saunders, 2008: 3). The decision-making 
among Russian energy policymakers has been and continues to be highly informal, with 
many key decisions agreed on after discussions among small groups outside official 
channels. For example, the deal ultimately reached between Gazprom and the Ukrainian 
firm Naftohaz in 2006 – channelling gas sales through a highly obscure firm 
RosUkrEnergo (cut out of the February 2008 Russian-Ukrainian gas deal) – was agreed 
on behind closed walls under the participation of a small number of lay actors 
(Saunders, 2008: 5). This deal ultimately had an effect of complicating financial flows 
and created lucrative opportunities for individual enrichment. 
Although Gazprom is widely perceived as a difficult business partner, it 
nonetheless has a prominent role on the European energy market. Albeit the reliance on 
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Russian natural gas varies among the European Union’s member states, Gazprom is a 
crucial part of Europe’s energy mix. The production of gas within the EU peaked in 
1996, then followed a production plateau and in 2004, production entered a state of 
decline (IEA, 2008). Faced with waning domestic gas reserves, the EU Commission 
agrees that the 27 Member States need Russian gas and will need it in the foreseeable 
future (IEA, 2007; van der Meulen, 2009: 834). European gas demand will increase 
from current 540 bcm to around 800 bcm in 2030, making Europe the largest gas market 
in the world (IEA (2006). World Energy Outlook 2006, IEA, Paris). 
Under these conditions, Russian Gazprom proposed the South Stream pipeline, 
which is considered to be a counter work and in response to Nabucco (Erdogu, 2010: 
2941). The project is a joint venture by Gazprom and the Italian energy company ENI, 
with the memorandum of understanding on the construction of South Stream signed in 
June 2007. The pipeline will connect the Russian upstream gas station Beregovaya, 
located on the Black Sea coast, with Varna in Bulgaria, passing through Turkish 
territorial waters. From Bulgaria, the pipeline will continue onwards in two directions: 
southwards through Greece to Italy; and northwards via Serbia to Hungary and Austria. 
Projected to cost around 15 billion Euros, the pipeline was to transport a maximum of 
63 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually. The gas will come most likely from 
Yamal reserves, although it is not yet specifically linked to any gas fields. 
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1Source: BBC News, 14 November 2009
Methodology
Through public relations activities, specific narratives are constructed around 
Nabucco and South Stream projects. This costly endeavour is necessary for both, the 
European Union and Russian Federation as created narratives camouflage their core 
political priorities, such as sustained economic growth, domestic unity, prestige and 
international power leverage. Critical discourse analysis (CDA) enables us to study this 
process in detail. 
CDA is used to examine documentary evidence to understand the discursive 
competition between Nabucco and South Stream pipelines over legitimate domination 
of the European discourse on energy security, and hence, to guarantee their right to 
survival. An expanded Fairclough’s three-dimensional model of text, discursive practice 
and social practice will be used to study the relationship between narratives and their 
intended effect on policy. 
On the primary textual level, I analyse communication activities of the Nabucco 
Consortium and South Stream and provide an overview of main texts issued by each 
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project to understand how they utilise language to gain dominance over European 
discursive space and how constructed narratives camouflage state actors’ core priorities, 
such as economic growth, domestic unity, prestige and international power leverage. On 
the second level, I study how these narratives are legitimised and reflected in the 
European discursive space and what meaning they acquire. Because the discursive space 
consists of all texts within a society – from official speech, to movies, word-or-mouth, 
art and other forms of verbal and nonverbal communication – there is a clear 
methodological difficulty applicable to all discourse studies, as it is clearly impossible 
to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the discursive space. Nonetheless, as has been 
noted earlier, unlike domestic issues that allow discursive space to form through media 
as well as word-of-mouth, discursive spaces regarding foreign events depend largely on 
media messages. In public diplomacy the media is the most powerful tool in 
constructing and shaping public discourse, and therefore, for the purposes of this paper, 
mainstream European media is taken to signify the dominant narratives in European 
discursive space. 
On the third level, I analyse how this meaning affects the perceived reality in 
regard to European energy security and what practical implications this carries for 
policy formulation and business operations of state and private oil and gas entities. 
Finally, I expand the Fairclough’s framework to include a fourth level of analysis – 
pertinent to this paper – to study how the produced texts and subsequent discursive 
spaces compare to ‘objective’ reality of technical and financial specifications of each 
pipeline. This allows us to assess the ability of Nabucco and South Stream to meet the 
expectations attached to their constructed meaning and to enhance energy security of the 
European member states. This last phase is intended to demonstrate the high discursive 
48
nature of legitimisation, which often exhibits serious divergences with ‘objective’ 
reality. Figure 1 provides an illustration of this methodological framework. 
For the textual analysis stage, I will look at messages issued by each actor – i.e. 
the press releases and official statements produced by the Nabucco Consortium and 
Gazprom, as well as the state organisations backing these entities – to analyse 
communication activities of these competing projects. A total of twenty-nine official 
texts will constitute the main source of empirical data. The statements have been 
intentionally chosen to be the most indicative of the legitimation attempts of each side. 
This is determined along three lines. First, these texts are of heightened importance or 
symbolism to each project (for example, the Memorandum of Understanding), making 
them key to understanding each project. Secondly, these texts have been widely 
reflected in mass media, making them more likely to influence the discursive space. 
And thirdly, these texts deal with the perceived threat to European energy security, 
making them directly relevant to the research questions of the paper. 
It is acknowledged that this approach has important methodological drawbacks 
and it cannot be regarded as statistically accurate from a formal point of view (as 
opposed to conducting random sampling). This method nonetheless allows for 
conducting a thorough analysis of the most critical pieces of texts, which is of greater 
significance for the research objective of this paper than a brief overview of larger 
amounts of texts. Although materials presented in this paper will focus on messages that 
are relevant to the research questions, this should not lead to an assumption that all 
communication activities by the Nabucco or South Stream projects are driven by 
legitimisation needs.
Next, I will analyse how these messages are reflected in mass media, to answer 
the question of how they are incorporated into the existing discursive space and how 
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they simultaneously contribute to its development. A total of nineteen English-language 
newspaper reports have been chosen on the basis that they appear in publications that 
are widely disseminated and read around Europe, and that they report specifically on the 
developments of the two projects. While this does not constitute a statistically-correct 
method of identifying the media response to Nabucco and South Stream, it nonetheless 
allows for a high degree in interpretation accuracy, since representations of these 
projects in the few most dominant mainstream media sources have the greatest influence 
over the public discourse.   
All of the studied texts have been produced in different periods of time, roughly 
correlating with significant milestones to the development of Nabucco and South 
Stream projects. Because securitisation is a dynamic, socially-constructed process, by 
association, legitimisation of responses to the security problem is similarly a process 
that responds to many dimensions of its external context. Therefore, an analysis of texts 
within a fixed point in time would lead only to a determination of the level of 
securitisation at that specific time period. To study the legitimisation moves themselves, 
which would determine the elements of the legitimisation process, one must analyse 
texts from different periods of time, as has been done in this paper.  
Nabucco texts 
The Nabucco project is currently the only ground breaking economic initiative  
for the greater diversity of gas sources and transportation routes and enhanced 
competition in Europe. No other project in the Southern Corridor can claim to compete  
on this basis 
nor is as advanced and well positioned as Nabucco.
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Nabucco spokesman, July 20105
In June 2010, when a PR agency Grayling has been selected to manage a PR and 
public affairs brief for the Nabucco Consortium, the company’s managing director 
openly commented that he expects “to be up against Gazprom’s campaigns for South 
Stream and Nord Stream” (PR Week, 2010). While Grayling was initially contracted by 
the Consortium, it works jointly between Nabucco’s private stakeholders and Brussels, 
demonstrating the close linkage between the pipeline’s economic and political 
dimensions. In accordance to the standard PR practice, the Consortium and Brussels 
establish campaign objectives; Grayling designs strategies, tactics and main messages; 
and the Consortium and Brussels’ leaders function as main visible actors of the 
campaign execution. 
A strong international lobby group consisting on many Central and East 
European political and energy sector leaders, as well as some key national natural gas 
companies, exists to promote the Nabucco pipeline. Regardless of the serious 
divergences among opinions of European member states – ranging from relative 
indifference from Western European states such as Spain and Portugal, to active 
promotion by states such as Romania and Poland – toward the Nabucco project, the 
pipeline is a pan-European project enjoying full-fledged support from the European 
Commission, which heralds it as the “flag project of the diversification efforts of the EU 
for our security of supply” (former Energy Commissioner Andris Piebalgs, 2008). 
The mouthpiece for this lobby is the European Commission, which acts as an 
aggregate and mediator of the various interests in the Nabucco project. Representative 
of this was the gaffe of the EU Energy Commissioner Günter Oettinger, who first 
5 Eastern Approaches Blog (2010). My pipe or yours. The Economist, 13 July 2010. Available at 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2010/07/pipelines.  
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mentioned that Nabucco’s construction timetable will be delayed until 2018, but under 
the pressure of pro-Nabucco lobby, the next day quickly issued a contradicting 
statement that the timeline has not changed and the project will be completed in 2014 as 
planned (EurActiv, 2010a). Therefore, regardless of the national and individual 
variations in attitudes toward Nabucco, the European Commission diligently adheres to 
the project and hence, for the purposes of this paper, is considered to be the primary 
actor behind Nabucco construction. The second relevant actor is identified as the 
“Nabucco Consortium” to define the private enterprises that are the primary financial 
stakeholders in the project. 
Together, these actors are interested in strengthening support for the project 
among relevant European publics. To achieve this, they must claim that their product is 
a legitimate answer to the existing energy security issue. Analysis of primary documents 
issued by Nabucco actors suggests that the project attempts to legitimately dominate 
European discursive space according to four characteristics: the pipeline’s ability to 
contract new supply sources; the high demand for its capacity; greater construction 
feasibility; and its symbolic function as a prestige project of the European Union. 
Private enterprises that form the Nabucco Consortium emphasise the former three points 
from a more technical standpoint; European Commission primarily focuses on the 
political aspects of the latter two dimensions. 
The Nabucco Consortium presents Nabucco as “one of Europe’s most important 
energy infrastructure projects to strengthen Europe’s security of supply for natural gas” 
(Nabucco Consortium, 2008). Its main competitive advantage lies in its ability to 
diversify not only transit routes (as can also be achieved by South Stream), but also to 
expand supply sources, making it a so-called “multi-sourcing project” (Nabucco 
Consortium, 2010a). Nabucco’s ‘new gas’ is expected to reduce European dependency 
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on the politically risky Russian supplies and the diminishing fields of domestic 
production. This narrative fits very well with the existing dominant discursive space in 
Europe, which perceives security of physical transit routes and continuous availability 
of supplies to be the main security issues at stake (European Commission, 2006). 
Underlying these political messages is a core European priority of an economic 
nature – diversification of gas transit routes would introduce competition to the 
transportation system in Eastern Europe, which ultimately would challenge Gazprom’s 
dominance of the Eastern European natural gas market and hence, lower end prices. 
This purely economic priority, however, does appear in Nabucco’s texts. Instead, it is 
camouflaged with the more ambiguous narrative of energy security.  
A key task behind Nabucco presentation is to illustrate that the project is 
economically in demand and that it is “driven by the needs of its customers” (Nabucco 
Consortium, 2011). Hence, the Consortium widely disseminates texts that highlight 
“huge demand for Nabucco capacities,” which are intended to legitimise the rising costs 
of the project (Nabucco Consortium, 2008). In various interviews and statements, 
Nabucco leaders – Managing Director Reinhard Mitschek in particular – voice their 
conviction that new infrastructure projects for Europe will be necessary to meet the 
rising energy demands (Mitschek, 2010). To achieve this, emphasis is given to the 
“strong growing gas market” in the EU, which requires Nabucco capacities to meet the 
rising demand (Piebalgs, 2007). 
Following the identification of the most critical reasons for construction of 
Nabucco, actors also focus on providing discursive evidence of the pipeline’s practical 
feasibility and most importantly - greater feasibility than that of South Stream. 
Similarly to the discourse behind South Stream, every minor development in regard to 
Nabucco is hailed as an important progress. The following statement by Former Energy 
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Commissioner Andris Piebalgs, which highlights the many steps that have been already 
taken, is one of many examples:
 
“…the European  Council  has  already agreed  the  objective  of  diversifying  our  gas 
suppliers  and,  most  importantly,  our  supply routes.  We have  already,  for  example, 
appointed a European Co-ordinator for the Nabucco project. This has  already shown 
useful  results.  The next Strategic  Review will  determine which additional  measures 
need to be taken to further catalyse such projects that are clearly in the EU's interest” 
(Piebalgs, 2008; italics added). 
From its side, the Consortium does not miss a chance to discuss every progress 
made by Nabucco partners:
“The Nabucco  project  has  made significant  progress  this  year  with the start  of  the 
Environmental & Social Impact Assessment; the signing of a mandate letter with the 
EBRD, EIB and IFC; the start of the front-end engineering design of the two feeder 
lines in Turkey; as well as the first pre-qualification process for long lead items. All 
these elements are crucial in the development of the pipeline and serve to show that 
Nabucco  is  the  most  advanced  project  in  the  Southern  Corridor”  (Nabucco 
Consortium, 2010b; italics added). 
Texts from the Nabucco Consortium and the European Commission construct a 
narrative that highlights every achievement as an “important milestone” and 
demonstrates the determination and support among all Nabucco stakeholders to 
complete the project (Nabucco Consortium, 2010b). 
This determination is explained by the last narrative behind Nabucco, namely its 
identification as foremost a “prestige project,” as identified by Energy Commissioner 
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Günter Oettinger (Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 2010). The Commission supports Nabucco, 
because it is a “truly European project” and a “symbol” of partnerships with new supply 
countries (Barroso, 2009; Oettinger, 2011). Hence, Nabucco is endowed with 
exceptional characteristics: unprecedented unity and commitment among European 
states, suggesting that this narrative attempts to gain domination through charismatic 
legitimation.
Additionally, the reference to Nabucco as a ‘symbol’ implies a larger meaning 
of the project. Symbols are identified by scholars to “stand for concepts that are too 
complex to be stated directly in words” and in many cases are employed to promote 
solidarity within a group (Womack, 2005: 2 and 27). This suggests that Nabucco may 
be as much about securing external supply sources and transit routes, as it is about 
enhancing the presentation of internal unity. According to former Energy Commissioner 
Andris Piebalgs, energy is a “European security issue” and Nabucco is the most 
adequate and coordinated approach to manage this issue (Piebalgs, 2007). With the 
myriad of divergences among member states over energy policies, Nabucco is presented 
as the only project that comprehensively accommodates and represents the interests of 
new EU members longing for greater political influence. Underlying these claims, is the 
ongoing endeavour of the European Commission to increase its powers within the 
European space. 
It is also hailed as the only large project that has seen close cooperation between 
Brussels and Ankara, making it “a powerful illustration of the strategic bonds between 
Turkey and the European Union” (Barroso, 2009). In fact, successful cooperation with 
Ankara is acclaimed in many speeches of Commission leaders, suggesting that with 
Nabucco, the European Union is also seeking to reinforce its economic ties with Turkey 
to maintain the state – an emerging regional power – as a close ally of the Union. 
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Gazprom texts 
The more people get to know Gazprom, the more comfortable they feel with the brand. 
We have to prepare the Gazprom story – and then tell it.
Philip Dewhurst, former head of PR, Gazprom Marketing and Trading, 2007
Our mission is to provide mass media with absolutely objective information on the 
Russian gas transit in order to shape an actual image among the society.
Alexey Miller, Gazprom Management Committee Chairman, 2009
The continuous growth of energy consumption and consequently, the increase in 
energy prices make this commodity one of the key leverages for influencing politics on 
the international arena and a tool for maintaining power and stability domestically. This 
renders that in any economy, oil and gas companies are tightly linked with the 
government, while in petro-states – such as Russia – they are so closely integrated with 
the state that the two are sometimes indistinguishable (Poussenkova, 2010: 103). 
Therefore, public relations activities of energy companies on the international arena can 
be said to constitute public relations activities of the state itself, especially concerning 
petro-states.  
Kremlin and companies identified with it have long suffered from negative 
reputations in the West and predictably, have lost many of the public relations battles. 
To rectify the problem, in 2007, Russia has contracted private PR firms in a desperate – 
and well-funded – drive to improve its image. For example, in March 2007, it hired 
consultancy Gavin Anderson to “improve understanding of Gazprom’s basic business 
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strategies” and to “strengthen the trust of investors in Gazprom” (Daly, 2010). In 
January and February 2007, another PR company Ketchum was tasked with a series of 
public relations objectives to improve Gazprom’s image abroad, with special attention 
to the company’s potential to promote European energy security. In particular, the 
companies’ responsibilities included arranging interviews for Gazprom officials with 
foreign media, constructing messages, developing fact sheets and background reports 
for distribution. 
With the effort in place since 2007, there is indication that Ketchum’s 
strategically organised communication efforts have been somewhat effective in 
improving Gazprom’s image in main events. For example, following Ketchum’s 
recommendations, during the 2009 gas crisis with Ukraine, Gazprom has maintained an 
on-line media presence, by regularly organising press briefings to report on its side of 
the unfolding crisis (see Gazprom news for January 2009; PR Week, 2009a). Indeed, 
European frustration since then has turned more to blame the Ukrainian side – a change 
that highlights the effectiveness of Gazprom’s increased transparency and 
communication tactics. 
Since 2007, Gazprom has successfully embraced the best Western PR 
techniques, ranging from the traditional interviews with world’s leading media, to 
developing English-language Twitter and Facebook accounts, to sponsoring a European 
yachting project and a German football team. In fact, Russia is said to be spending 
‘phenomenal’ amounts on PR in the West (PR Week, 2009a) – with Ketchum, GPlus 
Europe and Gavin Anderson agencies (all part of the Omnicom group) contracted by 
Kremlin and Gazprom. 
With the support of professionals, today the communication from Gazprom and 
Kremlin regarding South Stream is remarkably consistent, strategic and goal oriented 
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and similarly to the mission of Nabucco, South Stream is tactically presented as a 
project “aimed at strengthening the European energy security” (Gazprom, 2007). 
Gazprom insists that South Stream is a “European project intrinsically and spiritually” 
and therefore legitimately deserves space within the European discourse on energy 
security (Gazprom, 2009f). Analysis of texts produced by relevant actors demonstrates 
four identifiable communication goals: route diversification; higher demand for its 
capacity; greater construction feasibility; and supplier generosity and resource 
abundance. These narratives are intended to camouflage Kremlin’s core government 
priorities of economic stability, by maintaining high gas prices for European consumers 
under long-term contracts, and of political leverage in the near abroad, by threatening 
Ukraine’s monopoly over gas transit. 
In its narrative, South Stream attaches foremost priority to diversification of 
export routes to Europe, which – it argues – “corresponds with the European Union 
strategy” (Miller, 2011). However, unlike Nabucco, which seeks diversification without 
further specification, South Stream clearly identifies why its offer of route 
diversification is crucial: in order to avoid “critical” countries – Ukraine in particular 
(Gazprom, 2009a). In fact, throughout Gazprom’s discourse, the issue of gas transit 
through Ukraine is securitised, especially during the winter months and coinciding with 
the gas disputes, with the Ukrainian administration under the presidency of Viktor 
Yushenko presented as a threat to European energy security. The very visible crisis 
communication campaign of Gazprom during the 2009 gas dispute with Ukraine is the 
prime example of Gazprom’s securitisation technique, which seeks to present Ukraine 
as a deliberate transit risk, with Ukrainian authorities “refusing” to abide the contractual 
and legal requirements, as opposed to Russian unquestionable and transparent 
adherence. Hence, Russia insists that “Ukrainian side openly admits it is stealing gas 
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and has no shame about it” (Kupriyanov, 2009). Gazprom insisted that Ukraine “refused 
to transport Russian gas to Europe” and issued a myriad of press releases supporting this 
suggested interpretation frame: 
Prime  ministers  of  Bulgaria,  Slovakia  and  Moldova  see  for  themselves  that 
Ukraine blocks gas transit to Europe (Gazprom, 2009b);
Reports by international monitors confirm Ukraine has blocked transit of Russian 
gas (Gazprom, 2009c); or
Ukraine again refuses to secure Russian gas transit to Europe (Gazprom, 2009d). 
In line with the Kremlin’s general foreign policy approach, which attaches great 
weight to the legality of actions, Gazprom securitises transit of gas through Ukraine on 
the basis that the former violates international laws and does not meet its contractual 
obligations, for example: 
“In violation of the international law, since the beginning of 2009, Ukraine has been 
siphoning off the natural gas intended for European consumers....It’s obvious that such 
an  irresponsible  attitude  is  unlikely  to  be aimed at  meeting  transit  obligations and 
ensuring energy security in Europe” (Gazprom, 2009e; italics added). 
Gazprom’s policy of involving independent monitors, contacting the European 
Commission and publicising contracts is intended to increase publicity of this discourse 
and facilitate its naturalisation. Overall, in its attempt to demonstrate and assure that 
socially-accepted legal norms are implemented and observed in every aspect of its 
operations, Gazprom attempts to gain dominance through Weber’s legal-rational 
legitimation approach. 
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Ultimately, Gazprom presents Ukraine as a significant transit threat that 
deliberately prevents Russia in “continuing to fulfil its duty” of delivering gas supplies 
to Europe. This securitisation consequently allows the company to legitimately argue 
that these conditions demand a diversification of transit routes (specifically meaning, 
circumventing Ukraine), and this quality makes South Stream an absolute priority, as 
this pipeline “will serve as a guarantee of security and flexibility of Russian natural gas 
supplies to European markets” (Gazprom, 2010b). 
Underlying this narrative, is the Russian endeavour to exert political influence 
over Ukraine – arguably, Russia’s most important state in its near abroad. Ukraine, 
which annually transits about 100 billion cubic meters of Russian gas to European 
countries, is set to suffer financial and political losses, if Russia’s dependence on the 
Ukrainian transit system is reduced. The possibility of Gazprom decreasing significantly 
transit through Ukraine functions as a strong political leverage that could be used to 
wield political accessions. 
The second issue presented by the South Stream narrative is that in comparison 
to Nabucco, South Stream enjoys higher demand for its capacity. Similarly to the 
message of Nabucco, Gazprom argues that “upward gas demand trend will continue in 
the long run” and therefore, South Stream provides a real opportunity to “overcome the 
lack of energy carriers and maintain energy security in Europe” (Gazprom, 2010a). 
However, analysis shows that Gazprom, unlike Nabucco, does not focus as much on 
projected market growth, which it treats as a given, but rather contends that the demand 
for South Stream is driven by the projects ability to reduce transit risks by avoiding 
transit capacity losses in Ukraine (Gazprom 2009f). For South Stream, the question is 
not whether demand exists, but rather how can the project’s potential capacity meet the 
existing demand without serious hindrances. “That’s what this is about: to reduce transit 
risks to the lowest possible or eliminate them entirely” (Putin, 2010b). Hence, the 
capacity of South Stream is necessary in order to minimise capacity losses in securitised 
transit countries and “fully guarantee unbroken supplies.”
With the above security issues in mind, Gazprom contends that South Stream in 
contrast to Nabucco has greater construction feasibility. The communication campaign 
of Gazprom attaches significant emphasis to the “real” steps of South Stream towards 
provision of energy security in Europe (Medvedev quoted in Gazprom, 2007). 
Similarly, South Stream is presented to “provide one of the few real opportunities” to 
offset the decline in indigenous gas production in Europe (Gazprom, 2010a). Each 
Memorandum of Understanding, each agreement, virtually every signed document and 
all feasibility studies are presented as proof of the pipeline’s actual practical 
implementation and evidence of “a sophisticated understanding” and “dedication to 
execution” among Gazprom and its partners (Gazprom, 2010b). Extensive details 
regarding design, exploration work, construction operations and approvals are widely 
available online and often appear in press releases and official statements (see for 
example Gazprom, 2010a, 2011a; Putin, 2010b). 
South Stream’s real developments are contrasted to the uncertain fate of 
Nabucco. In particular, Russia consistently questions whether there are “resources with 
which to fill the [Nabucco] pipeline” (Putin, 2010a). It commonly stresses the following 
message:
“...the issue of the feedstock supply to the South Stream has never been a subject 
of debate, since Gazprom has an immense resource base and invests heavily in the 
development of new fields, while the resources are still not enough to fill the Nabucco” 
(Gazprom, 2011b). 
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Finally, Gazprom’s narrative hails the company’s and the country’s supplier 
generosity and resource abundance. It presents its immense and long-term resource base 
as a critical competitive advantage and insists that with its “unparalleled gas reserves” it 
can meet the demand “practically of all our customers in Europe for the next hundred 
years” as it has responsibly done in the past, rendering it unnecessary for Europe to seek 
independence from Russian supplies (Putin, 2010a). Russia’s ‘generosity’ is also 
highlighted by recurring messages regarding the fact that “the cost of Russian natural 
gas makes up only a third to a half of the consumer price, [while] local taxes and 
intermediary profit account for the rest” (Putin, 2010b). According to this narrative, 
Gazprom is and has been supplying generously Europeans with Russian natural gas, 
with any instances of broken supplies or high prices attributed to various third parties, 
but never to Russia. Hence, there is no need to build expensive projects seeking scarce 
resources elsewhere – or in the words of Putin (2010a), “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.” 
Instead of substituting the supplier, Russia suggests fixing the real problems, i.e. 
Ukrainian transit and European energy regulations.
This narrative of supplier generosity and resources abundance camouflages a 
key priority for Gazprom and the Russian Federation – the maintenance of long-term 
contracts and high prices for European consumers. Gazprom is responsible for 
approximately ten percent of the national GDP, while the sales of raw materials to the 
EU provide most of Russia’s foreign currency and contribute to over 40% of the 
Russian federal budget (EurActive, 2005). Until recently, Gazprom reportedly operated 
at a loss on the domestic market due to the dual-pricing policy that keeps domestic 
prices at a low lever to stimulate industrial activity, while the majority of Gazprom’s 
profits came from the much higher European gas prices. Even if the company is 
successful in expanding its customer base in Asia, the markets in the East will not be 
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able to match the high prices paid by the Europeans. Therefore, while Russia does in 
fact have plenty or gas to sell, its foremost priority is to ensure long-term high prices for 
this commodity in order to fund investment projects for energy exploration and 
extraction and to maintain political and economic stability domestically. 
Narrative interaction 
The crucial element of the four discursive goals of South Stream and Nabucco is 
their interaction – messages are significantly more important in their juxtaposition, 
while independently they carry considerably less meaning. For example, it is rather 
uncommon for energy projects to persistently seek to demonstrate evidence of their 
construction feasibility and this information is usually perceived to be too technical and 
hence irrelevant for the general public. Even the much more technically difficult 
Langeled and Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipelines have not extensively engaged themselves 
with such communication. But within the competition framework – in which the 
discourses of Nabucco and South Stream function – these messages are consistently 
primed, so that construction feasibility of both projects has remarkably entered 
widespread circulation and this issue acquired a whole new level of meaning. 
For this reason, communication objectives of the two projects must be 
considered in relation to one another (see figure 2). Both Nabucco and South Stream 
aim to demonstrate that their product enjoys higher demand and is more feasible than 
the other. Nabucco also contends that it will diversify routes and expand supply sources, 
which will exponentially benefit European energy security. In response, South Stream 
presents itself as a product that can offer an abundance of necessary resources – and 
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hence eliminates the need for Nabucco to search for new sources – and that Russia is a 
generous supplier. In response to this, Nabucco positions itself as a symbol and a 
prestige project embodying the aggregate interest of the entire European Union in 
diminishing its reliance on Russian gas imports, no matter how many of them Gazprom 
can provide. Here, South Stream actors usually retort: “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it” and 
question the necessity of reducing this dependence (Putin, 2010a). Additionally, 
Nabucco’s symbolic status is also met with Gazprom’s doubt over its practical 
construction feasibility and emphasis on South Stream’s greater feasibility.  
Figure 1: Interaction of main discursive messages of Nabucco and South Stream
Discursive space – media analysis
Harbouring various institutional biases, the mass media in order to appeal to and 
secure an audience exhibit a strong tendency to downplay the procedural and 
methodological components of research and concentrate only on the most substantive 
and ‘interesting’ conclusions. Simply put, “editors love drama” (Sloan and Mackay, 
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Nabucco
Narrative
(camouflaged core state priority)
Competition/reaction 
direction
South Stream 
Narrative
( camouflaged core state priority)
Higher demand for its capacity Higher demand for its capacity
Greater construction feasibility Greater construction feasibility
Route diversification 
and expansion of supply sources
(reduced gas prices)
Supplier generosity 
and resource abundance
(long-term contracts and high 
prices)
Symbol and prestige
(increased political power of  
Brussels; maintenance of close links  
with emerging power, Turkey)
Route diversification 
(political leverage over transit  
states, Ukraine in particular)
2002: 145). The issue of Nabucco and South Stream construction similarly became 
dramatised: the mainstream media outlets most prominent for the European public have 
chosen the “competition discourse” to dominate the narrative around these projects. 
This narrative gives prominence to a juxtaposition of technical, financial and political 
dimensions of each project, with particular focus on the competition for greater 
construction feasibility. Ultimately, this dichotomy has caused both projects to develop 
meaning beyond their immediate reality to signify a geopolitical confrontation between 
a victimised “Us” and the aggressive offensive of the “Other,” the outcome of which is 
seen as critical to the long-term security, values and prestige of the European Union. 
Until 2006, media coverage of Nabucco is relatively scarce, with most reports 
until then focusing on the pipeline’s potential to reduce EU’s dependency on Russian 
energy supplies (EurActiv, 2006). However, already in 2004, the coverage of Nabucco 
gradually became more politicised – the process coinciding with increase in natural gas 
prices and Gazprom’s gas disputes with its neighbours. As a result, by 2006, Nabucco 
was most prominently covered in reports about Gazprom’s “gas wars” and Kremlin’s 
“muscle flexing.” For example, the first mention of Nabucco in The International  
Herald Tribune (2006) was in a story about Europe’s fears that Gazprom “could trigger 
a new gas dispute or even an economic crisis in [Bulgaria,] a country heavily dependent 
on Russian energy resources.” Hence, prior to the introduction of South Stream, the 
Nabucco pipeline per se is constructed to represent a protective instrument to guard 
European states from the dangers of their reliance on Gazprom. 
However, because the meaning of “Us” becomes significant only when 
juxtaposed to the presentation of the “Other,” the meaning of the European Nabucco 
was elevated by its relation to Russia’s South Stream. Following the announcement of 
South Stream, the media has developed a narrative for Nabucco that highlights its strong 
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support among central and southern European leaders and “accord” among European 
politicians – a narrative that did not exist prior to 2008 (BBC, 2009a; 2009b). As the 
mainstream media story goes, new EU member states have exhibited unprecedented 
levels of unity behind the Nabucco project, which is absolutely critical in overcoming 
European reliance on Russian gas and resisting Gazprom’s offensive. This interpretation 
frame  prompts greater consolidation of the European “Us” against a very clear “Other.” 
In the European discursive space, the pre-existing image of Gazprom is that of 
an arm of the Kremlin, which is aggressively used as a political weapon. “Gazprom’s 
‘aggressive ways and hostility’ tops the agenda of international seminars on energy 
security” and a number of European Commission energy reforms have been labelled by 
the media as “anti-Gazprom” (Nemtsov and Milov, 2008: 23). Gazprom’s often 
aggressive stance has earned the company a distinction of being “the only energy 
company on the planet with a record of elevating utility disputes to geopolitical event,” 
and this frame has been zealously latched onto by the Western media (Daly, 2010). 
It is therefore not a surprise that within this discourse, reporting on South Stream 
is hardly benevolent. In fact, the presentation of South Stream when the project was just 
announced was framed as “new Russian gas pipeline deal cuts through EU unity” 
(EurActiv, 2007). The media has developed a narrative around South Stream as largely 
a “political and lobbying project” with four goals: to discourage private investments in 
Nabucco; to exert pressure on Ukraine by shifting gas to bypass it (seeking to coerce the 
country to share control of its transit system with Gazprom); to contract Caspian natural 
gas for Gazprom utilization; and to cut off Central Asian states (Turkmenistan in 
particular) from accessing pipelines of the EU Southern Corridor (see for example The 
Economist, 2010). 
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In simpler terms – and more commonly appearing in the media – South Stream’s 
purpose is to frustrate Nabucco’s hopes (Financial Times, 2011a) and prevent its 
progress:
“Just  as  work  on  the  long-stalled  project  seems  set  to  finally  begin,  some  shift  -- 
usually at the hand of Russian energy giant Gazprom -- alters the commercial landscape 
and Nabucco's chances appear to recede” (Radio Free Europe, 2009).
As Nabucco pipeline stalled, this explanation is evoked to justify the pipeline’s 
sluggish progress relative to that of South Stream. Hence, Nabucco is passively 
victimised, while South Stream is presented as an active and arguably, a much more 
powerful adversary. Its image is constructed to be that of a rival project demonstrating 
Gazprom’s unwelcome expansion into the European space, while its strategic 
communication campaign is commonly labelled as an “all-out offensive on the 
European energy market” (Radio Free Europe, 2010a, 2010b). 
Gazprom’s offensive is perceived to be so powerful, that European countries 
“surrender” to its pressure (EurActiv, 2010). And it is so determined, that it is hardly 
stoppable: 
“The [North and South Stream] pipeline projects are so critical politically to Russia that 
neither the global recession, nor the collapse of natural gas prices due to the surge in 
supplies of US shale gas, have been able to deter Moscow” (Financial Times, 2010a)
This narrative continues with linking Moscow’s determination to traditional 
geopolitics. As the story goes, because “the rivalry between [South Stream] and 
Europe’s alternative plan – the Nabucco pipeline – is one of the most intense in the 
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Caspian Sea region,” Kremlin’s consideration of the use of military force to “destroy the 
balance of forces close to the borders of the Russian Federation” cannot be excluded 
(BBC, 2010).   
Today, this competition discourse enjoys stable and unchallenged dominance 
over the European discursive space. Evidence to this is the strong marginalisation of 
alternative discourses, such as the emerging contradictory narrative that suggests the 
possibility of a merger between Nabucco and South Stream (EurActiv, 2011). This 
proposal is not widely covered by the mainstream news outlets, and when such coverage 
exists, it is always negated by the commentary or direct quotations presented in the 
article (e.g. Financial Times, 2011). This indicates that the competition discourse is 
satisfactory for the media and the public – it has achieved significant dominance and 
suits the preconceptions European public harbours of Gazprom, Russia and the 
European Union. 
In isolation, Nabucco pipeline has been at best presented as an illustration of 
European hopes – a conception that yet has many difficult questions to resolve before its 
practical implementation will be possible. But its consistent juxtaposition first to 
Gazprom’s gas disputes and later to South Stream have significantly politicised and 
elevated Nabucco’s meaning. Today, it is no longer merely a concept with questionable 
feasibility, but rather a pan-European common response against the offensive of the 
determinant “Other.” The coverage of Russia’s “hostile offensive” against Nabucco 
reinforces European fears about a Russian-led gas cartel and consequently allows the 
pipeline to acquire a much more political meaning. As a result, the created juxtaposition 
between Nabucco and Russia works in favour of the Nabucco project, by “persuading 
its sponsors that despite its acknowledged risks, going ahead with the new pipeline 
would be better than the alternative of being stuck with their current suppliers” that to a 
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large degree come from Russia (Erdogu, 2010: 2940). Only due to Russian hostility to 
Nabucco, the project became seen as indispensable for the European Union. 
Comparison to reality 
Because the European Union and Russia are natural, close partners in the energy 
trade, they share most of the risks and benefits of their relationship and are therefore 
mutually dependent on one another (Dmitriev, 2006). Assuming an economic rationalist 
perspective, such interdependence to a significant degree predicates security for the 
suppliers and consumers under the condition that trade is managed by transparent 
industry regulations and is overseen by bilateral binding agreements (Quiggin, 1997: 9). 
Although these conditions are difficult to fulfil, nonetheless systematic research into 
energy security of the whole European Union suggests that “in international 
comparison, Europe’s supply security is less critical than generally argued” (Neumann, 
2007). An abundance of literature, hence, questions the rationality of European 
securitisation of Russia as a gas supplier.
For the purposes of this paper, however, European energy security fears are 
taken as a given. Instead, this section focuses on the narrative around Nabucco and 
South Stream to compare constructed reality against the technical and financial 
specifications of each project, in order to determine whether the two pipelines can meet 
the requirements of their constructed meaning. 
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Demand for capacity 
Both Nabucco and South Stream compete for greater perceived demand, 
positioning themselves as critical to European long-term energy supplies. However, 
following the economic crisis in late 2008, the European market has been experienced a 
so-called “gas glut.” Due to marked technological progress in the energy sector, greater 
convergence of global gas markets, increased usage of alternative energy supplies and 
declining relevance of contract pricing patterns in continental Europe, economists have 
voiced an expectation of an oversupply of natural gas to prompt a pronounced buyer’s 
market in the European gas sector by 2013 (Deutsche Bank, 2010). Under these 
predictions, investment in high-cost natural gas transportation projects, such as Nabucco 
and South Stream, became seen as unnecessary. However, in spring 2011, analysts 
noted that this global natural gas glut is disappearing sooner than expected, largely due 
to economic recovery and that despite short-term volatility, in 20 years EU will be more 
dependent on gas imports than it is today (see for example Fowler, 2011). Additionally, 
the exploitation of shale gas in Europe is at best decades away. Regardless of these 
limitations, today the European natural gas market is significantly more competitive, 
which has the effect of reducing the potential for Gazprom’s political leverage and 
increasing energy security for consumers. 
Under these volatile market conditions, economic feasibility of additional high-
capacity transportation projects – such as Nabucco or South Stream – appears to be at 
best exceptionally doubtful. Both projects lack significant economic rationale behind 
their construction not only due to increased competition, but also because the demand 
potential of Southern European member states is low, which threatens the profitability 
of both projects. 
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Construction feasibility 
Similar can be said about Nabucco’s and South Stream’s competition over 
construction feasibility. While both projects have serious issues hindering their 
construction, Nabucco’s financial viability is particularly hard hit. Since inception, its 
total cost has substantially increased from initial 7.9 billion Euros, up to about 14 billion 
Euros in 2011 (although the Consortium to date refuses to give official estimates), due 
to increased prices for construction materials and the necessity to expand the pipeline an 
extra 550 kilometres. With such soaring costs, unless the EU leaders are prepared to 
fund the pipeline, there is little prospect of involved stakeholders raising enough private 
capital to financially commit themselves to an economically-uncertain project such as 
Nabucco (Erdogu, 2010: 2944). With the planned start of construction regularly 
delayed, there is still no indication when a final investment decision should be expected 
and who will shoulder the costs. 
While South Stream has its funds largely secured, its construction feasibility 
narrative overlooks a different but equally serious issue for the project: to date, Russia 
has not been able to secure a deal with Turkey for the usage of its territorial waters. 
Inability to reach agreement with Ankara even prompted Russian Deputy Prime 
Minister Igor Sechin to claim that Moscow is considering alternatives to the South 
Stream pipeline, such as LNG. Although the Ministry of Energy did not confirm these 
statements, the incident prompts doubts to Russian dedication to the project and ability 
to carry it out as planned. Similarly to Nabucco, these doubts are not reflected in official 
narratives. 
Route diversification and expansion of supply sources – Nabucco 
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A key element of Nabucco’s constructed narrative is its ability to diversify not 
only transportation routes, but also energy suppliers. To date, this is also Nabucco’s 
largest shortcoming, as the question of whether the Consortium will be able to secure 
adequate supply of gas remains. Azerbaijan – the original supplier for Nabucco – does 
not possess enough quantities of available natural gas. Its Shah Deniz II field – expected 
to come on-stream only in 2017 – has enough reserves only to supply half of the needed 
amount. To make matters worse, Russia has signed contracts with most Caspian states 
to buy significant amounts of their exported gas. 
Washington – a key external player in the project – has always seen 
Turkmenistan as one of Nabucco’s main co-suppliers, but a number of obstacles stand 
in the way of its participation, including the country’s existing agreements with 
Gazprom, its difficult relations with Azerbaijan and territorial disputes around the legal 
partition of the Caspian Sea. As a result, Turkmenistan appears practically out of reach 
– if one prefers to avoid the much more political unstable Iran – especially following the 
apparent abandonment of the Trans-Caspian-Pipeline. The country is also exhibiting 
heightened focus on trading with China, which significantly decreases its available 
resources for sale to Nabucco. Northern Iraq also does not have enough available gas to 
supply Nabucco, but could add to the gas mix. However, the region’s high potential for 
political instability and security risks overshadows the minor benefits of adding Iraq to 
the supplier list. This leaves only Iran, which has enough gas to supply the Nabucco 
demand, but only after substantial additional investment into the country’s energy 
infrastructure is made. Nonetheless, the political situation in Iran and the inability of the 
international community to resolve the country’s nuclear program preclude the 
possibility of buying gas from Iran or transporting it through the country.
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Similar insecurity is applicable to Nabucco’s proposed route, which poses a 
significant security problem for the pipeline, as it crosses the inherently instable regions 
between the south Caspian and eastern Turkey. By bypassing Russia, the pipeline will 
be constructed in states with known security problems and a poor track record of 
providing security for their energy transit infrastructure. The frozen conflicts in Georgia 
and Azerbaijan pose serious security risks, which hold strong potential to become 
threats within the next decade. But the biggest danger for Nabucco lies in its reliance on 
Turkey for transit. The country has had a number of attacks on its energy infrastructure. 
For example, in 2008 and 2009, several attacks by Kurdish separatists seriously 
damaged gas and oil pipelines in Turkey and northern Iran. But even traditional security 
issues aside, in the short history of the Nabucco project, Turkey has demonstrated itself 
as a less-than-reliable partner. Initially, the country sought to link approval for Nabucco 
to the opening of the energy chapter in its EU accession talks. It then demanded to 
impose a transit tax and wanted to take 15 percent of supply for its own needs at a 
discounted price (Erdogu, 2010: 2948). 
With these issues, the Nabucco pipeline does not appear poised to enhance 
European energy security. There is not enough available gas to make Nabucco 
commercially viable, except under the unlikely condition that the nuclear proliferation 
conflict with Iran is quickly resolved and the country’s underdeveloped northern gas 
fields are urgently developed (Hubert, 2011). Additionally, Nabucco carries the risk of 
increasing the bargaining power of its transit states, many of which, such as 
Turkmenistan, Georgia and Turkey have proven to be unstable, unreliable and risky 
partners in the past. At best, Nabucco may succeed in reducing the portion of risks 
relating to Russia; but this reduction will be offset with an increase in risks relating to 
instability and political objectives of new supplier and transit countries.
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Resource abundance – Gazprom 
Despite the confident discourse surrounding Russian natural gas reserves South 
Stream’s narrative regarding “resource abundance” is threatened in the short- to 
medium-terms. One of the big problems is the question of whether Russia will be able 
to supply adequate amounts of natural gas to meet the large capacity of the pipeline. 
Gazprom’s apparent strategy to expand significantly its transportation capacities both to 
existing Western customers and to new customers in the Eastern vector is not matched 
by a corresponding increase in natural gas production in Russia. Within a few years, the 
slow growth of gas production in existing and new fields of the Nadim Pur Taz (NPT) 
region will not be enough to compensate the steep decline of production in old 
supergiant fields. In order for Russia to avoid a production decline and to be able to 
increase its output of natural gas, it must urgently explore and exploit its large supplies 
in the difficult terrains of the Yamal Peninsula and the Shtokman field. If the Yamal 
peninsula is not going to be developed as planned, these longer delays “will make a 
significant impact on potential exports volumes to the European and CIS markets” 
(Soderbergh, 2010: 7841). Additionally, the ability of Russia to meet European and CIS 
demand is threatened by a clear and vast potential for a significant growth of Chinese 
gas demand, which has been successful in contracting gas supplies from countries 
traditionally supplying Russia – Turkmenistan, for example. 
Symbol and prestige – Nabucco
While Nabucco is hailed as a prestige pan-European project, in reality European 
member states do not consistently exhibit dedication to the pipeline. The Hungarian 
Development Bank has agreed to a South Stream Hungary Jrt. joint venture with 
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Gazprom; Austria has signed a deal to join South Stream; and intergovernmental 
agreements have been concluded with Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, Slovenia and Croatia 
and Austria to implement the onshore gas pipeline section. Gazprom is also currently in 
talks with another potential South Stream participant – Romania. In March 2011, 
Gazprom also signed a memorandum with Germany’s BASF, and as of April 2011, 
talks are ongoing regarding the entry of the French EDF in the shareholding structure of 
South Stream. These bilateral developments between individual European member 
states and national private firms significantly undermine Nabucco’s status of a pan-
European project illustrating member states’ unity in the energy sector. 
Political implications of perceived reality 
“Energy and politics are intrinsically interlinked,” and the case of Nabucco and 
South Stream is yet another evidence of this (Shaffer, 2009: 1). For many countries, 
including most prominently Russia and the political entity of the European Union, 
energy is an integrated element of national security and foreign policy. Whereas in the 
past, the issue of energy security was reserved for the specialised actors, today it “is on 
the table of every energy minister, as well as foreign, finance and industry ministers 
across Europe” (Piebalgs, 2006).
The popular discourse of the competition between Nabucco and South Stream is 
hardly without consequences. The dichotomy between the narratives and reality 
demonstrates modern preponderance with conventional geopolitical approaches in 
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issues relating to energy security policy. State actions are perceived through zero-sum 
game lenses with no opportunities for practical cooperation. The geopolitical 
competition discourse, surrounding the two pipelines, elevates them above normal 
politics and justifies policies that in normal circumstances would not be seen legitimate. 
The presence and popularity of such conservative geopolitical considerations in the 
energy sector popularises and normalises the application of geopolitical logic to explain 
the developments in the sector. As a result, Nabucco and South Stream become 
perceived as purely political projects, which justifies their little economic viability and 
questionable rational demand. 
Through strategic communication campaigns, Nabucco and South Stream 
pipelines came to signify each side’s geopolitical tools in a zero-sum game competition, 
even though the underlying objective reality does not rationally support this conception. 
However, at this stage, under the pressure of constructed mainstream discourse, 
abandoning the project by either side – even for strictly financial and rational economic 
reasons – would constitute a serious geopolitical loss that is likely to have long-term 
implications both for domestic public approval and for external relations between the 
two partners. As such, both projects today are propelled only by the discourse within 
which they exist; there is nothing else – no true economic incentive under existing 
market conditions – to continue with either Nabucco or South Stream, besides their 
discursive competition for domination and prestige.
In reality, there is much less geopolitical substance in the EU-Russia gas 
relationship as widely perceived. Russia has less leverage power over European 
customers than the discourse presents. In order for Gazprom to exert credible threat to 
European energy security, Russia must “dispose of sufficient gas volumes that can be 
reduced if politically desired” (Goldthau, 2008: 690). Today, this is not the case. In fact, 
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taking into account Gazprom’s investment policies of the last decade, there is serious 
doubt whether Russia will even be able to meet its basic export commitments. Under 
these strenuous conditions, the risk of Russia artificially reducing supplies to European 
customers for political reasons is highly unlikely. Even the gas disputes between Russia 
and CIS do not necessarily carry the purely political meaning that most publications 
tend to construct. These contractual disagreements are “less part of a geopolitical game 
of Kremlin, but rather reveal a quite rational approach of a company that has to 
compensate for a loss-generating home market” (Goldthau, 2008: 690).
But objective reality often gives way to perceptions that often have the most 
influence over policy formulation. While in reality, the necessity and viability of both 
Nabucco and South Stream are seriously questioned, public perception is diametrically 
opposite from this reality: a recent survey showed, that an overwhelming majority of 
energy experts and scholars in Central and Eastern Europe (92 percent) view both 
Nabucco and South Stream as effective projects that offer more security of supply for 
CEE and SEE region (LaBelle, 2011). Under these conditions, it becomes difficult for 
either of the two projects to choose a course of action that instead follows economic 
considerations.
By focusing almost exclusively on the political dimension, both projects suffer 
serious viability problems. For example, while South Stream has the potential to 
effectively remove the risks associated with transit disruption through Ukraine, it will 
provide an extremely costly direct access to a market with a small demand potential. 
Although the current discourse precludes alternatives to this scenario, in reality, other 
viable and much more economically rational possibilities exist. It is possible to achieve 
this transit risk elimination or even partial reduction if only offshore parts of South 
77
Stream were built. However, under the pressure of the current discourse, any such 
alternative would equate to a geopolitical loss.
Due to the nature of constructed narratives for Nabucco and South Stream, 
rational economic perspectives are largely absent in mainstream presentation of these 
projects. Instead, with their preponderance on alleviating social concerns and providing 
solutions for perceived political and social problems, both Nabucco and South Stream 
cease to be “businesses” in their traditional sense. While there is a general consensus 
among global corporations that an increased emphasis of social responsibility and 
increased attention to social matters is necessary, these steps never venture too far from 
the financial objectives of the corporations and are largely designed to facilitate a more 
accepting environment and improve legitimization of the corporation among the public. 
Increased involvement of businesses in political and social matters is deemed to be not 
“normal,” as best illustrated by the following comment of a former vice president of the 
Royal Dutch/Shell Group: 
“We found that many rational and intelligent people thought that it was a reasonable 
proposition that companies such as Shell should mediate to reduce tensions between 
different  levels  of  government,  or  that  they  should  take  positions  on  social  policy 
matters. At all times we should remember that Shell is a business. Activities as these 
are not within the normal, legitimate role of a business. Therefore, we cannot meet such 
expectations” (quoted in Vercic, 2009: 802). 
Herein lies a critical distinction between purely private energy firms and their 
state-coordinated counterparts, that have to tailor their business operations with state 
energy policy that is “discursively constructed so as to speak directly to core 
government priorities, such as economic growth and national security” (Scrase and 
78
Ockwell, 2010: 2231). The example of Nabucco and South Stream illustrates how state-
endorsed geopolitical vision supersedes economic and rational market considerations to 
promote two pipelines, the need and viability for which is at best highly questionable.
Nord Stream vs. Yamal II
While most state-sponsored natural gas projects are systematically presented and 
interpreted as political constructs, rather than merely engineering projects, clearly not 
all of them are purely political projects that lack economic incentive. The Nord Stream 
is a prime example of a state-sponsored project that carries not only political motives, 
but has strong economic incentives.  
The undersea Northern Europe Gas Pipeline (NEGP) – widely known as Nord 
Stream – is a political project to reduce political risk associated with transit countries, 
especially of Ukraine and Belarus, but equally to a lesser degree the Baltic states and 
Poland. More than 90 percent of gas intended to flow through Nord Stream over its 
lifetime is to be diverted away from existing transit corridors, mainly Ukraine (Chyong, 
Noel and Reiner, 2010: 19). Similarly to the case with South Stream, the discourse 
surrounding the project transformed the pipeline from a simple engineering project into 
a representation of Russia’s leverage in Europe. 
Similarly to the Nabucco-South Stream competition – albeit less prominently – 
Nord Stream ‘competed’ with Yamal II. Nord Stream has been said to be the most 
expensive transit option for Russian gas, with an estimated price tag of $10.5 billion 
compared to the Yamal’s $2.6 billion. Because Yamal II would have passed Poland, it is 
assumed that it “would have given Western and Central Europe greater political and 
economic security” (Hashim, 2010: 267). Instead, because the EU agreed to the Nord 
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Stream, it is perceived that the EU allowed Russia increase its leverage over the German 
energy policy, which invariably has led to serious consequences for all European 
member states. Ultimately, the general understating of Nord Stream, as it is presented in 
the majority of policy literature and mass media, is of a project that obliviously lacks 
economic justification and is therefore purely geopolitical in nature (see for example 
Holz et al., 2009, and Christie, 2009). 
While partially true, these arguments ignore an important point that Nord Stream 
decreases bargaining powers of highly volatile states, such as Belarus and Ukraine 
(Hubert and Ikonnikova, 2004: 11). Economic models show that the unit cost of 
shipping natural gas via Nord Stream is clearly lower than the cost of using the 
Ukrainian route and is only slightly higher than that of shipments through the Yamal-
Europe pipeline (Chyong, Noel and Reiner, 2010). These findings hold true even under 
a scenario of declining gas demand in Europe. Ultimately, the economic rationale and 
the main financial benefits behind Nord Stream is the resulting elimination of the transit 
risks and costs associated with insuring against disruption risks by diversifying transit 
routes (Hubert, 2011). 
In sum, popular discourse in its treatment of natural gas projects often dismisses 
economic considerations in favour of conventional geopolitical frames. At times, these 
frames are applicable; but in most cases they are too narrow to accurately describe 
reality and ultimately lead to faulty assumptions and defective policy decisions. 
Conclusion 
Discourses – and not reality – shapes, constrains and orients energy policy. The 
paper shows how Nabucco and South Stream have attained particular narratives that 
served to legitimise their existence and camouflage governmental priorities underlying 
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the projects. These narratives have gained exceptional popularity among the media, the 
experts and the general public, so that the constructed geopolitical discourse today is 
much stronger than the actual objective specifications of the pipelines and the energy 
market. As a result, the projects continue to exist and continue to spur policy debates, 
scholarly analysis and public discussions only due to these discourses – and not due to 
the actual objective importance of either Additionally, these narratives seriously limit 
policy choices of both actors, since the only acceptable action course within the 
conventional zero-sum game competition discourse is to continue the “fight,” until 
ultimately a winner emerges. Alternative actions will be understood as signs of defeat. 
Narratives and discourses enable humans to interpret reality. It is thus in the 
interest of every politician to attempt to exert influence over them though strategic 
communication campaigns, as has been done with Nabucco and South Stream. The 
effectiveness of these campaigns in the case discussed in the paper will certainly prompt 
increased attention to international public relations in the energy sector in the future. In 
our post-modern society, politicians will increasingly turn to media in an attempt to 
influence the perception of reality for domination and legitimisation purposes.
In fact, this future may not be so distant after all. Already in January 2010, 
Putin’s Press Secretary Dmitry Peskov wrote a disapproving letter to Washington Post, 
in response to the newspaper’s article accusing Moscow of politicising an energy 
dispute with Belarus. “The so-called ‘dispute’ between Russia and Belarus is in reality 
an ongoing negotiation between supplier and customer,” argued Peskov, noting that the 
article “was based on an unwillingness to follow daily news as well as a reliance on 
false premises and outdated stereotypes.” Peskov concluded that the article’s “ill-
considered, politically inflammatory commentary” serves only to further deteriorate 
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bilateral relations between Russia and Belarus and hamper trade negotiations (Peskov, 
2010).
Increased participation of politicians and policy-makers in the discourse 
formation will have consideration implications, both for the practice and study of social 
and political sciences. In the decades to come, as conventional natural gas remains a key 
element of global energy mix, politicians and social scientists alike must increasingly 
take into account the discursive nature of energy policy. 
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